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Preface
Decisions involving expansion or contraction of the scope of opera­
tion of a business have far-reaching implications. They are of a stra­
tegic nature and affect the very character of a business. This requires 
careful attention to both external and internal factors.
An important feature of analysis in these situations will be careful 
attention to expected changes in revenues, costs, and the size of the 
investment in resources.
Analysis for Expansion or Contraction of a Business is the third pub­
lication in this series of technical studies in management services.
The contents of this technical study are divided into two sections: 
(1) textual material concerning the type of analysis covered by the 
study, and (2) four case studies describing engagements performed 
by CPAs in that area. All the case studies are based on actual situa­
tions, although the names, locations, and, in some cases, minor details 
have been changed. In a few instances the figures also have been 
changed. Where this has been done, every effort has been made to 
avoid distorting significant relationships.
Each case study consists of two parts: (1) a description of the client 
situation as it unfolded to the practitioner, and (2) a description of 
how the practitioner dealt with the situation. The cases are presented 
in this format to enable readers to use them as a self-teaching device.
Several questions are asked at the end of part one: questions re­
quiring quantitative analysis of the data in the case; questions about 
how the job should be approached; questions about fee estimates or 
man-day requirements; and so forth. It is suggested that the reader 
should plan to read part one carefully and prepare answers to the 
questions presented before proceeding to part two. Part two then 
provides an opportunity for the reader to compare his analysis with 
that prepared by the practitioner.
Most management decisions do not have just one obviously right 
answer. Therefore, the reader’s solution to a case may frequently, and 
perhaps appropriately, differ from the approach taken by the practi­
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tioner. Working through the series of cases over a period of several 
weeks the management services student should find increasing confi­
dence in his ability to size up a situation and devise an approach for 
dealing with the particular problem area discussed in this bulletin.
This is the third in a series of five technical studies prepared under 
the general supervision of Professor Richard F. Vancil, D.B.A., CPA, 
Harvard Business School and Henry De Vos, manager, management 
services. Assistance in the field research and case writing was pro­
vided by Dr. James S. Hekimian, Dr. Charles J. Christenson, Dr. David 
F. Hawkins, Dr. Robert C. Deming, Dr. Robert C. Hill, and L. Paul 
Berman.
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Analysis for Expansion or 
Contraction of a Business
A conscious decision by management to change the size or scope 
of its business—to expand or contract—is one of the most important 
classes of decisions made in the business world. It may not be as criti­
cal as the decision to start a business, but given the far greater number 
of times a businessman may decide to expand or contract, one must 
accord this sort of decision paramount importance.
This management services technical study builds on the analytical 
methods discussed in the first two studies.1 The decision to expand or 
contract a business will involve changes in revenue, changes in a great 
variety of costs, including many overhead items, and usually substan­
tial capital expenditures. In considering either expansion or contrac­
tion, one must be aware of not only the attendant investment (or dis­
investment ) but also the effect on revenues (both in aggregate and per 
unit sold) and on many costs (some heretofore classified as variable 
and others as fixed). The businessman is faced with a number of alter­
natives, and with analytical problems which sometimes seem to defy 
an approach which will lead to the best solution.
The problem is complex in part because of the many variables and 
alternatives and in part because of the greater uncertainty which pre­
dictions of the future entail. An expansion or contraction decision, in 
the final analysis, rests upon projections of the future extending for
1 The reader may find it helpful to refer back to studies number one and 
two. In this study it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the 
techniques described in:
Management Services Technical Study 1—Cost Analysis for Product Line 
Decisions
Management Services Technical Study 2—Cost Analysis for Pricing and 
Distribution Policies
1
longer periods than were involved in the earlier studies. Many more 
alternatives are available in pricing and many more uncertainties sur­
round current knowledge of future pricing practices and future volumes 
of sales. Many more types of cost are variable, and what these costs 
are expected to be is subject to much wider fluctuation. The types and 
sizes of investments (or disinvestments) available to the firm, too, in­
crease both in number and uncertainty.
The Role of Management and Corporate Strategy
An important responsibility of management, one that becomes evi­
dent in discussing expansion and contraction decisions, is that of 
formulating long-range corporate strategy. Such decisions, no matter 
what their intrinsic merit may be for the short run, also have major 
long-term implications and influence the course of future management 
policies and actions.
A recent book2 on business policy discusses corporate strategy. The 
authors state that the development of a corporate strategy involves the 
consideration, and matching, of four elements which both comprise 
and react upon the company’s opportunities:
1. In formulating strategy, a starting point is to study the company’s 
environment. What opportunities are available to the business? What 
might the company do within this environment?
2. Closely related to this consideration is the company’s ability to 
act within this environment. What can the company do? What are 
the capabilities and limitations of its management?
3. In evaluating the internal potential of the company, the question 
of what management wants to do becomes important. What are man­
agement’s personal values? Given an environment within which man­
agement will operate the business, and given the limitations of the 
company’s ability to support action within that environment, what 
further limitations (or opportunities) are created by management’s 
own values and aspirations?
4. Finally, there is the concern over an obligation to society in gen­
eral. Society will be affected by any choice of strategy, but these 
repercussions have not been part of strategy formulation up to this
2 For a more thorough discussion, see Business Policy: Text and Cases, 
by Learned, Christensen, Andrews, and Guth, Richard Irwin, Inc., 1965.
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point. The relevant question, then, is what should management do? 
What is management’s responsibility to the society within which it 
will manage?
Through a process of seeking answers to these questions, the ultimate 
corporate strategy will be formulated. The implementation of strategy, 
then, becomes an administrative task. The task of operating manage­
ment is to mobilize and co-ordinate the resources available to the firm 
in order to accomplish established objectives within this predetermined 
framework.
It is within this framework that decisions about expansion and con­
traction will be made. Realizing, of course, that strategy by its very 
nature will change to meet new conditions, the expansion or contraction 
decision may be either in line with an existing strategy or part of the 
implementation of a revised strategy.
The Role of the CPA
Within the strategy thus established, we can outline the role of the 
CPA as an advisor to management. Since management will be dealing 
with figures, and since much of management’s analysis will be con­
cerned with projections of sales, profits, costs and investments, it is 
only natural to expect the CPA to become involved. The CPA is 
familiar in many cases with the cost and profit data which are gen­
erated within the firm, and he is aware of the story being told by such 
data. In addition, because of his understanding of these data, he has 
the knowledge and training to project these costs and other data into 
the future, given the proper assumptions and conditions under which 
the projections are to be made.
It is in this last phase wherein there lies a warning for the CPA. Re­
calling the elements of strategy formulation from the previous section,
—what might the company do
—what can the company do
—what does the management want to do
—what should the management do 
it is apparent tha t the CPA’s involvement is largely concerned with the 
first two. In the end, management must decide whether it will expand 
or contract. In trying to project the consequences of such action, there­
fore, it is important—even fundamental—that management become 
deeply involved in the analysis so that it may be able to understand 
and to review the accuracy of the results. Management must designate 
the general conditions under which it will operate. Management must
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project the general situation within which it expects to operate. Man­
agement must, in effect, provide a basic framework of its expectations 
and aspirations so that these may be reflected in the work of the CPA. 
No one can record data about a business’s future unless the manage­
ment of that business provides certain information. As information is 
gathered, the CPA can report what is likely to happen. His role, many 
times, will be that of an inquirer—asking the right questions. Then, 
based on data provided by the management, he can record the likely 
consequences of various courses of action in a form familiar and useful 
to management. A useful generalization about these major decisions, 
as contrasted with those in the preceding two bulletins, is that man­
agement must become more involved in the analysis.
A Method
As with most other business decisions, recognition and proper defini­
tion of the problem is the starting point for analyzing expansion and 
contraction decisions. Once the problem has been identified, a start 
will have been made. On most occasions the businessman himself will 
be the first one to see his problem, but increasingly the CPA by his 
comments, questions, suggestions, and his knowledge of his clients 
affairs, can focus on the problem or bring the need for action to a head.
The next step is that of identifying the alternatives—of bringing out 
for managerial consideration the possibilities which are available— 
without being unimaginative and excessively timid on the one hand 
or unrealistic and impractical on the other. Both the number, and 
especially the types of solutions, can be diverse in scope. Many times, 
a businessman will think of alternatives only within the scope of his 
current operations or in light of his own past experiences. The CPA, 
both by his familiarity with many other business situations and his 
awareness of this mental straitjacket, can contribute to the considera­
tion of a wider range of unusual and varied alternatives. Imagination 
and an awareness of many different practices in all kinds of industries 
contribute to the CPA’s ability to broaden the horizons of manage­
ment’s thinking. The CPA can also help to keep the solutions consid­
ered within realistic bounds.
The next step, that of helping to make the actual projections in order 
to anticipate the consequences of various alternatives, is well within 
the CPA’s normal competence. Undoubtedly, he will have to ask many 
questions, gather data from company records, gather data from outside 
the company, and know when to call in expert help. But given his 
familiarity with the particular business and with the making of projec­
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tions in general, he can carry out this task. The CPA must also be care­
ful to operate within the meaning of Opinion 10 of the Code of 
Professional Ethics of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac­
countants which states:
Opinion No. 10: Responsibility of Members for Pro Forma State­
ments and Forecasts Under Rule 2.04
In preparing for management any special purpose financial 
statement anticipating results of future operations, a member 
must disclose the source of the information used and the major 
assumptions made, and he must indicate that he does not vouch 
for the accuracy of the forecast.
Rule 2.04 provides that "A member or associate shall not permit 
his name to be used in conjunction with any forecast of the 
results of future transactions in a manner which may lead to the 
belief that the member or associate vouches for the accuracy of 
the forecast.”
The ethics committee is well aware that pro forma statements of 
financial position and results of operation, cost analyses, budgets 
and other similar special purpose financial data, which set forth 
anticipated results of future operations, are important tools of 
management and furnish valuable guides for determining the future 
conduct of business.
The committee is of the opinion that Rule 2.04 does not prohibit 
a member from preparing, or from assisting a client in the prepara­
tion of, such statements and analyses. However, when a member 
associates his name with such statements and analyses, or permits 
his name to be associated therewith, there shall be the presumption 
that such data may be used by parties other than the client. In 
such cases, full disclosure must be made of the source of the 
information used, or the major assumptions made, in the prepara­
tion of the statements and analyses, the character of the work 
performed by the member, and the degree of responsibility he is 
taking. Such disclosure should be made on each statement, or 
in the member’s letter or report attached to the statements. The 
letter or report of the member must also clearly indicate that the 
member does not vouch for the accuracy of the forecast. It is the 
opinion of the committee that full and adequate disclosure would 
put any reader of such statements on notice and restrict the state­
ments to their intended use.
For his own protection, the CPA will qualify the projections in an 
appropriate manner, making clear the nature and source of the major 
assumptions, and restrict the use of the projections, particularly as far 
as third parties are concerned.
Once the consequences of various courses of action have been re­
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corded, he can help interpret the various alternatives for management. 
Where earlier the CPA asked questions of management in order to 
translate management’s thinking into projections, he can now take the 
projections and help to make sure that the projections are understood 
by management.
Once a decision is made, the CPA can assist in drawing up plans to 
implement the decision. This will involve anything from budgets—so 
that actual results can be compared with the anticipated results on 
which the decision was made—to working out programs for related 
matters, such as raising money to implement a particular course of 
action.
The following case situation involving the Eastern Special Machinery 
Corporation will be used to highlight the important points raised in the 
preceding discussion and will also provide a vehicle for portraying the 
role played by one CPA in an expansion decision.
Eastern Special Machinery Corporation
In July 1965, the management of the Eastern Special Machinery 
Corporation faced a critical problem, arising primarily from two factors:
1. Continuing severe price competition in the industry
2. The imminent retirement of the company’s founder, William 
Swanson.
The new president and chief operating executive, Richard Belmont, 
felt that it would be important to take a careful look at the company’s 
future. This involved the careful evaluation of what seemed to be a 
limited number of quite different alternative courses of action available 
to the company. These alternatives were:
1. Continue operating as in the past
2. Sell out
3. Expand and modernize current facilities
Alternative 1, in Mr. Belmont’s opinion, would lead to eventual failure 
and erosion of the value of existing resources.
Background
The Eastern Special Machinery Corporation had been founded by 
William Swanson in 1926. Mr. Swanson had built up the business from
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a three-man, back alley operation to its current size, employing about 
150 people in 1965. The company’s primary business was the manufac­
ture and assembly of special purpose production equipment for other 
industrial concerns. Typically, the equipment was designed by the cus­
tomer’s engineering department and, on the basis of detailed blue­
prints and specifications, bids to manufacture the equipment were 
solicited. Eastern enjoyed a good reputation for its ability to solve the 
unique manufacturing problems that such equipment often posed and 
for its record in meeting delivery schedules. Much of the machining 
work done by Eastern could be performed with standard machine tools, 
and as a result the company had met increasing competition from 
smaller, less-skilled job order machine shops. More significantly, sev­
eral of its direct competitors in the manufacture of special machinery 
had invested in new, automatically controlled machine tools which 
permitted them to submit lower bids on contract proposals. The 
effects of these trends were reflected in the company’s financial state­
ments (Exhibit 1, below, and Exhibit 2, p. 8) over the years 1960-1964. 
Eastern’s financial position was fairly strong as a result of reducing its 
long-term debt, but profits in 1964 were less than half the amount of 
1960 even though sales volume had increased.
As Mr. Swanson began to contemplate retirement, Mr. Belmont and 
a group of the younger executives became more and more concerned 
about the company’s future. Because of the increased competition, 
Eastern had increasingly relied on Mr. Swanson and his personal con­
tacts to provide business. Now, as Mr. Swanson put it, it was time for
Exhibit 1
EASTERN SPECIAL MACHINERY CORPORATION 
Comparative Statements of Income
For the Years Ended December 31, 1960-1964 
(In  Thousands)
Years Ended 
December 31,
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Net sales ................................................. $1,411 $1,576 $1,407 $1,389 $1,575
Cost of goods sold ............................ 1,115 1,257 1,134 1,129 1,345
Gross profit ....................................... $ 296 $ 319 $ 273 $ 260 $ 230
Selling, administrative and
other expenses ............................... 142 160 153 152 165
Profits before federal income taxes .. $ 154 $ 159 $ 120 $ 108 $ 65
Federal income tax ........................ 74 76 57 51 30
Net income ....................................... $ 80 $ 83 $ 63 $ 57 $ 35
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Exhibit 2
EASTERN SPECIAL MACHINERY CORPORATION 
Comparative Balance Sheets 
(In Thousands)
December 31, 1960-1964
December 31,
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Assets
Current assets
Cash ........................................... $ 25 $ 58 $ 30 $ 41 $ 60
Accounts receivables, net ....... 128 119 145 139 102
Inventory ................................... 78 116 135 140 169
Prepaid expenses ...................... 11 10 12 16 20
Total ....................................... $ 242 $ 303 $ 322 $ 336 $ 351
Fixed assets, net .......................... $ 825 $ 704 $ 606 $ 479 $ 428
Other assets ................................... $ 4 $ 5 $ 8 $ 7 $ 8
Total assets .......................... $1,071 $1,012 $ 936 $ 822 $ 787
Liabilities and stockholders equity
Current liabilities
Accrued items .......................... $ 31 $ 38 $ 31 $ 38 $ 54
Accounts payable...................... 132 102 77 64 77
Notes payable .......................... 40 17 26 15 39
Total ....................................... $ 203 $ 157 $ 134 $ 117 $ 170
Long-term debt ............................ $ 450 $ 400 $ 330 $ 200 $ 100
Total liabilities ...................... $ 653 $ 557 $ 464 $ 317 $ 270
Stockholders equity
Common stock .......................... $ 155 $ 155 $ 155 $ 155 $ 155
Retained earnings .................... 263 300 317 350 362
Total ....................................... $ 418 $ 455 $ 472 $ 505 $ 517
Total liabilities and equity .... $1,071 $1,012 $ 936 $ 822 $ 787
Mr. Belmont and his management team to begin to look ahead into 
the future of “their” company.
Days of Decision
During the next month, Mr. Belmont and various other executives 
discussed and rediscussed the future facing them. Finally, Mr. Belmont 
identified the major alternatives—continuing unchanged, selling or 
merging, or modernizing and expanding the plant.
Mr. Belmont had never had experience in approaching this sort of 
business decision. He could see what his alternatives were; however, 
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he lacked a basis for making a logical choice among them. What seemed 
necessary was the type of data which, even though projected on the 
basis of assumptions and uncertainties, would nevertheless enable them 
to make a better evaluation of the alternatives than they could make 
at present.
Mr. Belmont decided there was good reason to keep these delibera­
tions confidential. If customers became aware of one alternative—sell 
out—they might start to think about other sources of supply. He also 
didn’t want competitors to find out what Eastern’s situation was. And 
finally, he didn’t want to start a guessing game among the employees 
as to what would become of the company and their jobs.
Mr. Belmont at first thought of going to the local bank with whom 
they had done business for many years but then decided (in view of 
his not wanting to convey possible financial requirements) to wait 
until his mind was made up on the basic decision itself.
Mr. Belmont concerned himself with many things. Among them 
was his responsibility to Mr. Swanson and the other stockholders, re­
sponsibility to the employees, responsibility to other executives of 
Eastern, and the responsibility to the small town in which the company 
was located and whose payroll was fairly important to many of the 
local merchants.
A Source of Help
Mr. Belmont decided, therefore, to turn to Mr. John Riley, a partner 
in the local CPA firm, which had done the company’s audit and tax 
work and had given them valuable advice on other business problems 
over the years. Mr. Belmont outlined some of the company’s problems 
to Mr. Riley, the major ones being general manufacturing inefficiency 
relative to competition, the loss of Mr. Swanson’s personal sales con­
tacts, and the nature of the alternatives open to them. Mr. Riley, in 
turn, agreed to work on this problem along with one of his partners, 
Arthur Reynolds, who was more familiar with this kind of business 
problem.
Mr. Reynolds’ Orientation
After an initial orientation and discussion, Mr. Belmont gave Mr. 
Reynolds a copy of a memorandum which he had prepared. The more 
salient points are summarized as follows:
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1. It is evident that if no action is taken, the Eastern Special Ma­
chinery Corporation will go out of business within five to ten years 
with a substantial erosion of current value. The best that can be ex­
pected under the current method of operation, taking into account the 
company’s inefficient equipment and manufacturing technology and 
the fixed nature of certain costs, is a slow decline in sales revenues, a 
slow rise in manufacturing costs, and a more rapid change from our 
present small profit to increasing losses. All indications are that, if 
“status quo” operations are continued, this will not leave stockholders 
any better off than an immediate liquidation and that they will prob­
ably fare far worse.
2. Eastern is not competitive from a cost standpoint. Plant size and 
layout do not allow efficient manufacture; a worse problem, however, 
is that existing equipment is old-fashioned and inefficient. Meanwhile, 
sales volume is too low either to permit efficient manufacture or to jus­
tify the purchase of new equipment.
3. Merger with a competitor would be in the best interests of the 
stockholders, unless management can envision sufficient sales volume 
to enable efficient utilization to be made of modem equipment and 
procedures. Liquidation is the other alternative although I doubt if 
we’ll find a buyer for most of our fixed assets. This will, of course, keep 
down our merger value too but I’m afraid we can’t help it now. The 
feasibility of undertaking to modernize will depend on whether there 
are:
(a) Sufficient market potential for the company’s products to pro­
vide the needed sales volume
(b) Sufficient resources to invest in new equipment
(c) Sufficient human resources (management and skilled employ­
ees) to accomplish the above.
Mr. Reynolds agreed that an investigation was essential, and out­
lined what he felt should be done. He also stated that he thought they 
should consider a new location so that there would be no constraints on 
plant layout and work methods. His thesis was, “Let’s look at this prob­
lem under the best conditions with no constraints. Only if that seems 
favorable, should we explore ways of adapting to the present plant.”
Mr. Belmont agreed, but thought that he should discuss this entire 
matter thoroughly with Mr. Swanson and the other stockholders. After
10
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a number of such meetings, Mr. Belmont received the endorsement of 
all stockholders to proceed with the investigation proposed by Mr. 
Reynolds. At that last meeting, Mr. Swanson had made the point that 
so far as he—owner of 40 per cent of the stock and controlling another 
25 per cent—was concerned, profits alone would not be the sole cri­
terion in carrying on the business. He felt a certain responsibility to 
the community and also noted that personal pride stemming from the 
existence of this business which he had created and built were im­
portant factors. And he wanted the “sharp pencil boys” to be aware 
of these factors in any recommendations they made.
Summary
It will be useful to pause at this point and note some important fac­
tors. Management identified the existence of a problem and defined 
the problem. The CPA helped by reviewing Mr. Belmont’s initial 
analysis and by looking at the company’s environmental situation and 
relating it to the company’s resources which were available to react to 
this situation. Management also developed a number of alternatives. 
Reynolds reviewed these alternatives and had an opportunity to ap­
praise them. In this instance, he suggested a slightly different approach 
which was accepted by management. During this entire process, man­
agement had exercised its prerogative to make the final decision on 
alternatives.
The Analysis
About a week later, Messrs. Belmont, Reynolds, and Riley met to 
map out a plan for investigation. After a couple of hours of discussion, 
they agreed that the basic question could be stated as follows:
Can this company become competitive enough with modem 
equipment to achieve the needed sales volume to justify the 
investment?
There appeared to be a typical “chicken or egg” dilemma. They couldn’t 
get the sales volume without lowering prices; and yet they couldn’t 
lower prices without getting the volume to achieve lower cost opera­
tion. They could do neither without a substantial investment.
They decided that, in order to organize their efforts, they should 
prepare a list of the kinds of data and analyses that would be required
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to evaluate this question and then assign specific tasks to each individ­
ual on the team. After some discussion, the following list was pre­
pared:
Data and Analyses Required for Evaluation 
of Eastern's Possible Expansion
1. Environmental and Industry Data
a. Projection of future industry sales volume, recognizing the 
continued and increasing desirability of special-purpose 
production equipment as a way of holding down labor costs
b. Technological forces at work, such as computer-controlled 
general purpose equipment, and effect on demand for spe­
cial-purpose machinery
c. Future industry price levels, as reflected in bidding 
formulas
2. Eastern’s Future Sales Potential
a. Historical market share and prospective share at average 
industry prices
b. Eastern’s price-volume sensitivity. How much will the vol­
ume change if a pricing formula that is higher or lower 
than the industry average is used?
c. Physical volume represented by various sales levels, taking 
account of overall industry price trends and Eastern’s own 
pricing policies
3. Future Manufacturing Costs With Present Facilities
a. Capacity measurement for present plant. Can capacity be 
expanded with little or no investment?
b. Manufacturing costs at various levels of plant utilization
4. Characteristics of Optimal New Facilities
a. Technological evaluation. Is this the time to re-equip, or 
are further substantial improvements expected? What type 
of equipment and plant layout is desirable?
b. Capacity to be acquired (must be related to item 2 above) 
and investment required to obtain it
c. Manufacturing costs at various levels of plant utilization
5. Summary Evaluation
a. Profitability of alternative pricing policies with present 
facilities
12
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b. Incremental profits that could be earned with new facili­
ties. Is the return on investment adequate?
c. Financing possibilities and costs if the new investment is 
made
d. Strategic and policy considerations for the future of the 
company. Does the company really have a choice?
The group discussed each of these points individually until there 
seemed to be general agreement about the task that each entailed. For 
example, future industry price levels was not the simple problem of 
forecasting unit selling prices for standard products; special produc­
tion equipment, by definition, was of unique design, and the prices 
were arrived at through the application of bidding formulas. The prob­
lem, therefore, was to predict the impact of improved manufacturing 
technology on industry-wide production costs, and to estimate the 
extent to which cost reductions would be reflected in lower price quo­
tations. Similarly, the expectation that prices would continue to drop 
posed a problem in measuring Eastern’s physical volume, and there­
fore, its manufacturing costs, at alternative projected sales levels. As 
Mr. Reynolds put it, “We’re really trying to figure out the desirability 
of becoming the most efficient builder of special machinery in the 
industry. If we do make a substantial new investment in numerically 
controlled and other automated equipment, our costs will be lower than 
many of our competitors, just as their costs are currently lower than 
ours. If there is an advantage in being somewhat late in this re-equip­
ping, it lies in the fact that we need only meet the bids of our competi­
tors to get a good market share; we can’t predict the future level of 
industry prices by applying our bidding formula to our own costs with 
new equipment. Thus, we must work on sales volume and industry 
price levels independently of our analysis of our own manufacturing 
costs and capacity requirements.”
The group agreed with this statement of the problem, and decided 
that work could be done simultaneously on topics 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the 
list above. Mr. Belmont and the sales manager agreed to work on the 
first two items (industry trends and Eastern’s future sales potential), 
while Messrs. Reynolds, Riley and the plant manager would work on 
items 3 and 4. Once these tasks had been done, the group could then 
combine their data in order to evaluate overall profitability, financing 
requirements, and other policy matters. Brief descriptions of the work 
done on each of the first four tasks follow.
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Sales Volume Projections
The fallowing is a summary of the actions taken by the group con­
cerned with industry data and Eastern’s sales forecasts. The two men 
spent considerable time reviewing statistical data available from their 
trade association and other industry sources, concentrating on informa­
tion about growth in volume and changes in prices. For the industry 
as a whole, there appeared to have been about a 2 per cent annual de­
crease in prices over the past four years. Eastern’s prices, too, had de­
creased during this time, but more slowly, and although Eastern’s sales 
revenue had increased last year, market share had decreased. Through­
out, Mr. Reynolds kept in touch with this group and at one point 
recommended that Mr. Belmont hire a consulting economist to project 
industry sales for the next five years. The economist, who had had some 
experience with this industry, felt that prices would continue to de­
cline slowly in the future at an average rate of about 1 per cent per 
year. This was based on some of his research which indicated that 
many firms in the industry had been making new investments and im­
proving their operating efficiency during the years 1960-1964, but that 
this activity had begun to level off. Mr. Belmont knew that this was 
true because in late 1963 Eastern had adjusted its bidding formula to 
bring it into line with its competitors, with the effect that volume 
had increased although profits had continued to decline.
As the next step, Mr. Belmont, assisted by his sales manager and 
the economist, attempted to project the growth in industry volume. 
The first finding was that Eastern’s market share had declined more 
rapidly in the last five years than Mr. Belmont had realized; the in­
dustry’s 1964 sales volume was nearly 50 per cent greater than the 1960 
volume, while Eastern’s volume increase over the same period 
amounted to only 10 per cent. Weighing all the technological factors, 
the men agreed that further substantial volume increases, at a slightly 
reduced rate of growth, were in prospect.
Then, with the help of the economist, the two men addressed them­
selves to the question: What will happen to our sales volume with each 
2 per cent change in price? They studied data on company-wide sales 
and prices covering the last four years. They then broke the data down 
by regional markets and restudied the problem. They finally reasoned 
that by meeting the average industry price (which had a built-in 
annual price reduction of 1 per cent per year), they would retain their 
present market share. They reasoned further that 2 per cent changes
14
ANALYSIS FOR EXPANSION OR CONTRACTION OF A BUSINESS
from the average industry price would result in the sales revenues 
shown in Table 1:
Table 1
Alternative Pricing Policies and Sales Revenues 
(In Thousands)
Projected 
Industry Sales —6% —4% -2 %
At
Industry
Price +2% +  4% +6%
1966 $17,000,000 $2,008 $1,906 $1,802 $1,700 $1,598 $1,496 $1,394
1967 18,200,000 2,147 2,038 1,929 1,820 1,711 1,602 1,493
1968 19,600,000 2,314 2,196 2,078 1,960 1,842 1,724 1,606
1969 21,000,000 2,478 2,352 2,226 2,100 1,974 1,848 1,722
1970 22,000,000 2,596 2,464 2,332 2,200 2,068 1,936 1,804
Upon reviewing this much of the work, Mr. Reynolds noted that the 
changes in physical volume of manufacture would be about 2 per cent 
greater or smaller than the changes in sales revenues; that is, a 2 per 
cent reduction in price in 1966, for example, would lead to a 6 per cent 
increase in sales revenue, but this would indicate an 8 per cent increase 
in volume of manufacture.3 Therefore, Mr. Belmont would have to 
relate his sales revenues of $1,802,000, for example, to the costs of 
manufacturing 8 per cent more than the amount needed to achieve 
sales revenues of $1,700,000.
After this step, Mr. Reynolds suggested that Mr. Belmont ask his 
sales force for their opinion. The question put to them was: If we in­
creased (decreased) our overall price schedule by 2 per cent, 4  per 
cent, or 6 per cent, what would be the effect on our sales? Mr. Bel­
mont also asked the sales manager to answer the same question for 
direct sales accounts.
The major difference between these projections and those worked 
out with the economist was the wider variations of the former. Finally, 
Mr. Belmont took all the data from both sets of projections and de­
veloped Table 2, page 16.
3 More precisely, the physical volume would be 108.16 per cent of
 106 per cent of normal revenue      
normal,   — —-----------------------------------   =  108.16 per cent, but the
  98 per cent of average price  
estimates of price sensitivity were too crude to justify using these more 
precise volume calculations.
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Table 2
Final Projected Sales Revenues 
(In Thousands)
At Average
-6 % —4% -2 %
Industry
Price +2% +4% +6%
1966 $2,200 $2,000 $1,900 $1,700 $1,600 $1,400 $1,200
1967 .................... 2,400 2,200 2,000 1,850 1,750 1,600 1,400
1968 .................... 2,550 2,350 2,150 2,000 1,850 1,700 1,500
1969 2,700 2,550 2,350 2,200 2,000 1,800 1,600
1970 .................... 3,000 2,800 2,600 2,400 2,200 2,000 1,800
Although these were Mr. Belmont’s “final” figures, he realized 
that all they really would do is provide a first pass at the entire problem 
when tied in with the projections of the other group.
Manufacturing Costs With Present Facilities
The first problem to be dealt with was to arrive at a measure of 
physical production volume. Because of his close co-ordination with 
the activities of Mr. Belmont and his team preparing the sales projec­
tions, Mr. Reynolds knew that the sales data would use a projected 
“average industry price” each year as a base for measuring the volume 
effect of alternative price policies. Thus, each specific future sales 
figure would need to be adjusted for both (1) the effect of the partic­
ular price policy, as noted earlier, and (2) the change in the projected 
average industry price from year to year.
Mr. Reynolds decided that an effective, simple way to deal with the 
physical volume problem was to measure changes from a base point, 
and he selected the projected 1966 volume of $1,700,000 (at the av­
erage price) as his reference point. This volume was approximately 
equal to the 1964 sales volume, although he noted that 1966 manu­
facturing costs at this volume would have to be adjusted to reflect 
two annual price decreases over the intervening years. Referring then 
to Table 2, Mr. Reynolds could calculate the physical volume (as a 
percentage change from $1,700,000 sales in 1966) fairly easily. If the 
sales volume was $2 million in 1966, for example, the sales dollars 
would be 117 percent $2,000,000$1,700,000 of the volume at the “average”
-1 0 0 %
price, but the $2 million volume would require a 22 per cent increase 
117% sales increase
96% of average price
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in physical volume. In 1967, the
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$1,850,00 revenue at average prices would amount to 109 per cent of 
the revenue in 1966, but the projected 1 per cent decrease in average 
prices meant that physical volume in 1967 would be 110 per cent of 
the 1966 base volume.
With a series of such calculations, Mr. Reynolds was able to pre­
pare Table 3, reflecting the change in physical volume for each of the 
sales revenue figures shown in Table 2.
Table 3
Projected Change in Physical Volume of Manufacture 
(Base Period: 1966 Average =  0)
—6% -4 % -2 %
At Average 
Price +2% +4% +6%
1966 ......... .......  +38% +22% +14% 0 -8 % -22% -32%
1967 ......... .......  +52% +38% +22% +10% +6% 0% -12%
1968 ......... .......  +62% +48% +32% +20% +  14% +6% -4 %
1969 ......... .......  +74% +60% +46% +32% +24% +14% +3%
1970 ......... .......  +94% +86% +63% +47% +38% +27% +18%
Once the measurement concept to be used had been agreed upon 
(and before Table 3 was available, pending the preparation of Table 
2 by Mr. Belmont), Mr. Reynolds and his team began their analysis of 
manufacturing costs in the existing plant at various levels of physical 
volume. They felt that this would be an important point of departure 
from which they could evaluate the cost of operating a proposed new 
plant. The results of their investigations, described below, are sum­
marized in Table 4:
Table 4
Current Operating Conditions
Projected Manufacturing Costs 
(In Thousands)
1966
+30% +20% +10% Estimates -10% -20% -30%
Material ........... .. $ 405 $ 365 $ 330 $ 300 $ 270 $ 245 $ 225
Direct labor ..... 910 810 726 660 594 525 465
Rent .................. 100 80 80 80 80 80 80
Depreciation..... 190 165 150 150 150 150 150
Supplies ........... 85 75 66 60 54 48 43
Supervision ....... 80 60 55 50 50 50 50
Indirect labor .... 160 140 130 120 110 110 100
Other ................ 43 38 35 32 29 26 24
$1,973 $1,733 $1,572 $1,452 $1,337 $1,234 $1,137
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Messrs. Reynolds and Riley had decided to look at volume changes 
between +30 per cent and —30 per cent. On the plus side, 30 per cent 
was the physical limitation of the present plant. On the minus side, 
they felt that anything lower than 30 per cent would not be worth in­
vestigating. The remainder of the methodology can best be described 
by discussing each of the costs separately:
Material. Taking the actual 1964 costs (latest figures available), 
the two men first computed an adjustment to give effect to the ex­
pected price decreases in 1965 and 1966, arriving at $300,000 as the 
estimated material costs against a 1966 sales revenue of $1,700,000. 
Next, they wanted to estimate the effects of changes in physical volume 
on these costs.4 The plant manager felt that material usage would 
be uniform from —10 per cent to +10 per cent. Above +10 per cent, 
he felt that wastage would increase as indicated in Table 4. Although 
the reverse would not be true at lower levels, the plant manager felt 
that the company would not be able to get as good a price on lower 
volume purchases, and that therefore there would be a less than pro­
portionate reduction in material costs. Mr. Riley checked this with 
the purchasing agent who agreed and provided estimates of the extent 
of this. In order to check further on material costs, Mr. Riley plotted 
material usage against physical manufacturing volume on a graph for 
the last five years. He was able to fit a fairly good straight line to 
these plots, but there was a tendency for the ratio of material usage 
to manufacturing volume to increase during years of lower volume. 
This appeared to be a good confirmation of the information supplied 
by the plant manager.
Direct Labor. The plant manager felt that within a —10 per cent 
to +10 per cent range of current activity, the plant was at its best 
efficiency relative to labor. Mr. Reynolds checked this against histor­
ical records and found it to be true on the lower side. Since there was 
no evidence of the higher side, he tried a month by month comparison 
for the last three years. In the six highest volume months, labor costs 
did rise more rapidly than volume and provided, in his opinion, suf­
ficient data for the cost estimates. He rejected the possibility of 
making time and motion studies as too costly to be justified in this 
early phase of the analysis.
4 For a useful article on forecasting changes in costs, see “Investment 
Analysis: Coping With Change” in the Harvard Business Review, May-June, 
1965, p. 62.
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Rent. Of course, this would remain constant, except at a 30 per 
cent increase over current volume which was now impossible because 
of space limitations. The company, however, could make sufficient 
space available to achieve the increase by taking back some excess 
space which it had rented out for $20,000. This space could be made 
available with a year’s notice.
Depreciation. This would not change for lower volumes or for an 
increase in volume of up to 10 per cent. Beyond 10 per cent there 
would be a need for new equipment, resulting in the projected in­
creases in the depreciation charge. The plant manager observed that 
he would not like to see the company spend any new money—on that 
particular kind of equipment. Mr. Reynolds reminded him that they 
were merely trying to develop a bench mark against which they could 
compare the costs of a proposed new plant.
Supplies. Mr. Riley developed these figures based on a review of 
past changes in this cost (a monthly comparison against volume over 
the most recent two-year period).
Supervision. This cost had been constant up to the current level 
of operation. The plant superintendent felt that there would be an 
overtime cost of supervision of $5,000 at a 10 per cent increase. For a 
20 per cent increase, he checked with Mr. Belmont who agreed they 
would add a new man at $10,000 salary and would incur no overtime. 
A 30 per cent increase, because of both overtime operations and the 
need to provide supervision in the new space, would require $10,000 
for overtime and $10,000 for another new man.
Indirect labor. At each step increase in volume, there would be 
a need for additional material handlers. This flexibility did not exist 
on the downside and was borne out by a study of past records. At a 
30 per cent increase, because the new space was inconveniently lo­
cated, there would be a larger than normal increase in this cost.
Other. This was Mr. Riley’s and the plant manager’s figures merely 
averaged together.
Profitability of the Existing Plant
By the time the analysis leading to Table 4 was complete, Mr. 
Belmont had also completed the sales projections shown in Table 2. 
At this point, while waiting for the analysis and data concerning the 
new plant, Mr. Reynolds decided to complete the profitability study
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of the existing plant. The results are shown in Exhibit 3. Preparation 
of this exhibit required converting the physical volume changes in 
Table 3 into manufacturing costs by interpolating from the capacity 
utilization figures in Table 4. In addition, Mr. Reynolds made a rough 
estimate of the magnitude of selling and administrative expenses, 
realizing that these costs were mainly fixed but that they had a tend­
ency to creep up as sales volume and manufacturing activity increased.
Exhibit 3
EASTERN SPECIAL MACHINERY CORPORATION 
Profit Projections With Existing Plant 
( In Thousands)
Alternative Pricing Policies
1966 -6 % —4%
Average Industry
+4% +6%—2% Price +2%
Sales revenue $2,100* $2,000 $1,900 $1,700 $1,600 $1,400 $1,200
Manufacturing cost 1,973 1,781 1,636 1,452 1,360 1,214 1,107
Gross profit $ 127 $ 219 $ 264 $ 248 $ 240 $ 186 $ 93
Selling & administration 210 202 190 172 165 158 156
Profit before tax $ (83) $ 17 $ 74 $ 76 $ 75 $ 28 $ (63)
1967
Sales revenue $2,100* $2,000 $1,850 $1,750 $1,600 $1,400
Manufacturing cost 1,973 1,781 1,572 1,524 1,452 1,316
Gross profit $ 127 $ 219 $ 278 $ 226 $ 148 $ 84
Selling & administration 205 197 184 178 172 170
Profit before tax $ (78) $ 22 $ 94 $ 48 $ ( 24) $ (86)
1968
Sales revenue $2,125* $2,000 $1,850 $1,700 $1,500
Manufacturing cost 1,973 1,733 1,636 1,524 1,406
Gross profit $ 152 $ 267 $ 214 $ 176 $ 94
Selling & administration 200 196 190 183 181
Profit before tax $ (48) $ 71 $ 24 $ (7) $ (87)
1969
Sales revenue $2,150* $2,000 $1,800 $1,600
Manufacturing cost 1,973 1,829 1,636 1,488
Gross profit $ 177 $ 171 $ 164 $ 112
Selling & administration 209 203 195 192
Profit before tax $ (32) $ (32) $ (31) $ (80)
1970
Sales revenue $2,055* $2,000 $1,800
Manufacturing cost 1,973 1,901 1,701
Gross profit $ 72 $ 99 $ 99
Selling & administration 207 205 200
Profit before tax $(135) $ (106 ) $(101)
*  In these cases, due to the capacity restraint, Mr. Reynolds interpolated the sales 
revenue (from Table 2) that could be expected if the plant operated at capacity (130 
per cent of the 1966 base volume). Profits for price cuts below that needed to achieve 
full capacity were not computed.
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When Mr. Reynolds discussed the profit projections in Exhibit 3 
with Mr. Belmont, he made the following major points about the re­
sults which would be obtained under that set of assumptions:
1. The company is not going to be very profitable under any cir­
cumstances.
2. The company is going to suffer profit-wise no matter which way 
it moves on volume. Higher volumes lead to manufacturing inefficien­
cies which are greater than economies due to lower per unit “fixed 
costs,” and lower volumes do not allow sufficient contribution to cover 
fixed charges.
3. By 1969 the company will be forced into an unprofitable level 
of operation, and output limitations would force the company to re­
turn to its 1962-63 practice of raising its prices above the industry 
average.
“We’ve got to do something else, and we’ve got to do it pretty quick,” 
summed up Mr. Belmont.
Summary
The CPA’s approach on the cost side is interesting. He knew his 
main task would be to evaluate the profitability of a new plant. In 
order to do so, he had to project the status quo first. In performing 
this task, he gathered data from various people and, where appropri­
ate, he checked this data by analyzing existing cost records. He was 
careful to limit his investigation in relation to the value of the infor­
mation he was likely to generate.
The CPA paid attention to those future costs which would change 
as volume changed, and he was interested in what they would be in 
the future, not simply what they were in the past. He did use the 
past, where appropriate, as a guide to the future. Also, notice that the 
CPA used the rental income that would be lost as a cost factor.
Projections for the New Plant
Since the profit performance of the company, using the present 
plant, would continue to deteriorate, both Mr. Belmont and Mr. 
Reynolds were eager to review the profitability that could be expected 
with a new, modern facility. In transmitting these figures in an in­
terim report, Mr. Reynolds explained how he conducted this part of 
his analysis:
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We decided to think in terms of a plant with about double the 
capacity of our present facility. According to engineering estimates 
by Duncan and Duncan,5 which were also reviewed with knowl­
edgeable company personnel, this is the minimum size required 
to achieve the same level of efficiency as your larger competitors. 
It enables you to use modem, labor-saving equipment and allows 
the establishment of an effective workflow. We decided to extend 
this analysis from 80 per cent above the 1966 estimated volume to 
40 per cent below it. We feel the lower limit is more than adequate 
for your purposes ( that is, we can’t imagine the usefulness of even 
thinking about anything lower) and although we realize that 
80 per cent over next year’s volume is probably a long way off, 
we did want to look at costs under those conditions in order to 
provide an indication of the desirability of striving to reach that 
level. As may be noticed from the summary (Table 5), material 
and labor usage are quite efficient as compared with current con­
ditions, and generally speaking, although there is a higher level of 
fixed costs, the total costs per unit of output decrease significantly 
as volume increases.
Table 5
Projected Manufacturing Costs With 
New Plant and Equipment
(In Thousands)
1966
Estimated
+80% +60% +40% +20% Volume -20% -40%
M aterial............. $ 450 $ 400 $ 350 $ 300 $ 250 $ 200 $ 160
Direct labo r...... 540 480 420 360 300 240 190
R en t................... 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Depreciation .... 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
Supplies ............. 58 53 48 44 40 36 33
Supervision ...... 65 65 60 60 60 60 60
Indirect labor ... 160 150 150 140 140 130 130
Other ................. 58 53 48 44 40 36 33
$2,031 $1,901 $1,776 $1,648 $1,530 $1,402 $1,306
You will note that with the new layout it is possible to achieve 
the 1966 estimated volume with $250,000 of material costs, a 
saving of $50,000 compared to the costs with the present plant. 
Duncan and Duncan has assured us this is possible because of 
the very low material wastage on the new equipment. Suppliers 
of this kind of equipment have suggested even higher savings.
5 A local industrial engineering firm (with whom we have had satisfactory 
relationships in the past) who were retained to assist in preparing this 
portion of the cost projections.
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Duncan and Duncan also provided data on labor costs, showing 
that $360,000 will provide enough manpower to produce the 1966 
volume. The labor savings with the new equipment are the com­
bined effects of (1) a dramatic reduction in set-up time with the 
automated equipment, (2) reduced spoilage of semi-finished parts 
due to more accurate set-ups and better tolerances, and (3) 
somewhat faster operating speeds on the new equipment. One 
of Eastern’s engineers is familiar with the costs of one of your large 
competitors and feels that this estimate is conservative.
The rent of $150,000 is for a four-year-old building, about a mile 
and a half away, now empty, which would appear to suit your 
purposes well. (If this particular building is not available when 
and if you decide to move, you can consider comparable buildings 
which are available within about a four-mile radius for about 
the same rental.) Depreciation of $550,000 includes both the new 
equipment ($2,500,000 depreciated over the guideline lives averag­
ing six years) and those pieces of the existing equipment which 
can still be used. Other costs are based on our own analysis.
Supplies expense is related to material usage and has been 
projected on that basis. Supervision is based on estimates made 
by various equipment suppliers and by Duncan and Duncan as 
to the supervision needed with the new equipment. These esti­
mates indicate that you will need one more foreman at the 
projected 1966 level of operations, but beyond that, only overtime 
would be a factor. The same is true with indirect labor. At the 
1966 volume, you will need more indirect labor, mostly to feed into 
and out of the new equipment.
Note that at the 1966 level of operations your present facility 
costs would be $1,452,000 and the new facility costs would be 
$1,530,000. The comparison below will highlight the increasing 
efficiency of the new facility with higher volume:
C ost a t  
1966
+60%  +50%  +40%  +30%  +20%  +10%  V o L  -1 0 %  -2 0 %  -3 0 %  -4 0 %
C u rre n t  . . . .  $ . . .  $ . . .  $ . . .  $1,973 $1,733 $1,572 $1,452 $1,337 $1,234 $1,137 $1,037
P ropo sed  . .  1,901 1,839 1,776 1,712 1,648 1,589 1,530 1,466 1,402 1,354 1,306
Notice how clearly the relative efficiency of the new plant asserts
itself as volume increases so that you can produce 23 per cent 
160%
130%
at a lower total cost ($1,901,000 v. $1,973,000)!
more than the maximum capacity of the present plant,
Profitability of the New Plant
Using these cost data, Mr. Reynolds was then able to prepare profit 
projections with the new plant (Exhibit 4, p. 24) similar to those al­
23
ready prepared for the existing plant. He assumed appropriate reduc­
tions in administrative and other costs due primarily to a smaller work­
force and in some measure to a somewhat more efficient office layout. 
Profits were substantially higher, and the projections also indicated 
that Eastern could pursue an aggressive pricing policy, at least for the 
next few years until their competitors improved their productivity to a 
level equal to that permitted in Eastern’s new plant.
Exhibit 4
EASTERN SPECIAL MACHINERY CORPORATION 
Profit Projections With the New Plant 
(In Thousands)
Alternative Pricing Policies
-6 % -4% -2 %
Average
Industry
Price +2% +4% +6%
1966 Sales revenue $2,200 $2,000 $1,900 $1,700 $1,600 $1,400 $1,200
Manufacturing cost 1,763 1,661 1,613 1,530 1,479 1,392 1,340
Gross profit $ 437 $ 339 $ 287 $ 170 $ 121 $ 8 $(140)
Selling &
administration 195 184 178 165 162 157 150
Profit before tax $ 242 $ 155 $ 109 $ 5 $ (41) $(149) $(290)
1967 Sales revenue $2,400 $2,200 $2,000 $1,850 $1,750 $1,600 $1,400
Manufacturing cost 1,851 1,763 1,661 1,589 1,565 1,530 1,453
Gross profit $ 549 $ 437 $ 339 $ 261 $ 185 $ 70 $ (53)
Selling &
administration 208 195 184 177 173 165 160
Profit before tax $ 341 $ 242 $ 155 $ 84 $ 12 $ (95) $(213)
1968 Sales revenue $2,550 $2,350 $2,150 $2,000 $1,850 $1,700 $1,500
Manufacturing cost 1,914 1,826 1,725 1,648 1,613 1,565 1,504
Gross profit $ 636 $ 524 $ 425 $ 352 $ 237 $ 135 $ (4)
Selling &
administration 218 205 194 185 178 173 163
Profit before tax $ 418 $ 319 $ 231 $ 167 $ 59 $ (38) $(167)
1969 Sales revenue $2,700 $2,550 $2,350 $2,200 $2,000 $1,800 $1,600
Manufacturing cost 1,992 1,901 1,813 1,725 1,674 1,613 1,548
Gross profit $ 708 $ 649 $ 537 $ 475 $ 326 $ 187 $ 52
Selling &
administration 228 217 204 195 187 178 168
Profit before tax $ 480 $ 432 $ 333 $ 280 $ 139 $ 9 $(116)
1970 Sales revenue $2,478* $2,600 $2,400 $2,200 $2,000 $1,800
Manufacturing cost 2,031 1,920 1,820 1,763 1,693 1,636
Gross profit $ 717 $ 680 $ 580 $ 437 $ 307 $ 164
Selling &
administration 230 218 207 196 188 179
Profit before tax $ 487 $ 462 $ 373 $ 241 $ 119 $ (15)
* Interpolated revenue against the capacity constraint. ( See footnote on Exhibit 3.)
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Return on Investment
Although it appeared that the proposed expansion was desirable, 
both Mr. Belmont and Mr. Reynolds thought they should make a rough 
calculation of the rate of return on the investment in the new equip­
ment. Such a calculation, they realized, would also be useful in ex­
plaining the desirability of the expansion move to Mr. Swanson and 
other stockholders and to Eastern’s bank or other potential leaders. 
First they compared the profitability of the two alternatives, as shown 
in Table 6:
Table 6
Comparative Profitability With Old and New Plants
(In Thousands)
Year
Existing Plant (Ex. 3) New Plant (Ex. 4)
Incremental
Profit
Optimum 
Price Policy
Profit 
Before Tax
Optimum 
Price Policy
Profit 
Before Tax
1966 Ave. $ 76 —6% $242 $166
1967 Ave. 94 —6% 341 247
1968 Ave. 71 —6% 418 347
1969 +2% (32) —6% 480 512
1970 +6% (101) —4% 487 588
The next step was to convert the incremental profit figures from 
Table 6 into incremental cash flows which would be available to re­
cover the investment in the new equipment. This calculation (Table 
7) took account of income taxes, incremental depreciation write-offs 
on the new equipment, and a rough projection of the minimal equip­
ment replacements that would be required in the existing plant to 
replace worn-out equipment.
Table 7
Incremental Cash Flow From New Plant
( In Thousands)
Year
(1)
Incremental
Profit
(2)
Incremental
@ 48%
(3)
Incremental
Depreciation
(4)
New Equipment 
for
Existing Plant
(5)
(Cols. 1 + 3 + 4 -2 )
Incremental 
Cash Flow
1966 . $166 $ 80 $400 $— $ 486
1967 . 247 119 400 — 528
1968 347 167 400 50 630
1969 . 512 246 400 75 741
1970 . 588
Five-Year Total
282 400 75 781
$3,166
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At this point, Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Belmont agreed that the 
$2,500,000 investment in new equipment would be justifiable, under 
the assumed conditions, because it would recover investment in slightly 
more than four years. Mr. Reynolds pointed out that, even with a 
conservative assumption that the “life” of the new equipment was 
only six years (and assuming a cash flow of $800,000 in 1971), the 
rate of return on the new equipment was approximately 15 per cent 
after taxes (Table 8 ):6
Table 8
Rate of Return on New Investment 
(In Thousands)
Cash Inflow or 
(Outflow)
Investment: cost of
equipment $ (2,500)
Less: investment tax credit
at 4 ⅔ % , one year from now 116
Net investment
Incremental future inflows: Year
1966 $ 486
1967 528
1968 630
1969 741
1970 781
1971 800
Total
Discount
Factor at Discounted 
15% Rate Cash Flows
1.000 $(2,500)
.870 101
$(2,399)
.870 $ 423
.756 399
.658 415
.572 424
.497 388
.432 346
$ 2,395
“However,” Mr. Reynolds went on, “were just now to the point 
where we can really begin to evaluate these two alternatives. There 
are some major estimates and assumptions that we need to reconsider, 
such as the desirability of using the new plant to cut price quotations. 
If we just continue to meet the industry norm, we won’t get the 
volume increases that really make this equipment pay off. But Eastern 
has a reputation for quality and service, and cutting prices for a few 
years might damage that image.
6 For a discussion of the discounted cash flow technique, and alternative 
techniques for evaluating capital expenditures, see Harold Bierman, Jr., 
and Seymour Smidt, The Capital Budgeting Decision, New York, Macmillan, 
1960.
26
ANALYSIS FOR EXPANSION OR CONTRACTION OF A BUSINESS
“We also need to look at the risks that this investment entails. Our 
projections show us that, because of the large fixed costs, our profits 
would actually be less at low volume with the new plant than with 
the old. We’ve had five prosperous years since 1960, but we also know 
that the capital goods industry—including special purpose equipment 
—is cyclical, and we need to think through how we’d be able to 
weather a recession in 1967 or 1968.
“But perhaps most importantly, we know that Eastern has got to 
improve its productive efficiency if it is to survive; the real question 
is when should we make this investment. One thing that these pro­
jections have shown is that profits with the old plant won’t decline 
any further for the next couple of years, and perhaps you ought to 
hold off any major step right away. At the very least, we want to 
review the technological assumptions to try to insure that we don’t 
buy equipment that will be outmoded in a couple of years.”
As these comments illustrate, the analysis described above is not 
“completed” in any sense, but a useful start has been made and ap­
propriate paths for further study are easy to identify.
Summary
Expansion and contraction decisions have far-reaching implications 
because they frequently affect the very character of a business. Since 
these decisions are of a strategic nature, there is a need to be concerned 
with both internal and external factors. Before the CPA can begin 
examining the specifics of a problem, management must think through 
a broad strategic framework in order to provide guidelines. Man­
agement’s own aspirations and ethical considerations provide a be­
ginning for this framework. The CPA, to be sure, can raise questions 
and can be a great aid in helping management to formulate this part 
of company strategy.
In analyzing that part of management’s inquiry concerned with a 
particular expansion or contraction decision, the CPA can take a more 
active role. Many of the analytical techniques described in the first 
two Management Services Technical Studies are directly applicable 
to these decisions; the Eastern Special Machinery Corporation illus­
trates the need for both a careful analysis of production costs, and an 
examination of price-cost-volume relationships. But these individual 
techniques are of greatest value in dealing with broader, more stra­
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tegic problems in which many variables must be considered simul­
taneously, and the sub-problem analyses must be interrelated.
Within this framework, the CPA is an ideal choice to assist in ex­
pansion and contraction decisions. He is familiar with the usual 
decision-making process: identifying the problem, suggesting alterna­
tives, making projections, interpreting data, and reporting the conse­
quences of various courses of action in a form that is meaningful to 
management. Once a decision is made, the CPA can continue to assist 
in implementation.
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Central Electrical Distributors, Inc.
In February 1965 Harold Lawrence and William Barnett, President 
and Executive Vice President, respectively, of the Central Electrical 
Distributors, Inc., of Detroit, Michigan, paid a call on Edward Red­
ington, partner of the CPA firm of Jarrett, Farmer & Co., to request 
his firm’s assistance in an evaluation of Central’s problems. Central 
Electrical Distributors, Inc., had been an audit client of Jarrett, Farmer 
& Co. for over ten years, and Redington had been partner in charge 
of the account for the bulk of that time. He was also a good per­
sonal friend of Mr. Lawrence. The two men had served together on 
the boards of a number of civic and public service organizations, 
and saw each other socially quite frequently. Redington was un­
derstandably concerned, therefore, when Lawrence said, “As you 
know, Ed, we’ve not been doing well in recent years; however, 1964 
was close to a disaster for us. Bill (Barnett) and I have been study­
ing our preliminary 1964 financial statements, and they seem to con­
firm our worst fears. Something is radically wrong at Central—we’ve 
got to find out what it is, and make some plans to correct the situ­
ation. You’re the best person we can think of to help. Will you do 
it?”
Jarrett, Farmer & Co.
Jarrett, Farmer & Co. was an old, established CPA firm, with offices 
in downtown Detroit. In 1965 the firm consisted of six partners, sev­
enteen professional assistants, and six supporting staff. The firm was 
one of Detroit’s larger local firms, providing a wide range of auditing, 
tax and management services work for clients that ranged from pub­
licly owned medium-sized manufacturing companies to small stores 
and professional men. Management services accounted for about 8
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per cent of Jarrett, Farmer & Co.’s billings in 1964, but this type of 
work had grown rapidly from a nominal level as recently as 1960. 
Management services assignments were normally allocated to one or 
more of four of the professional assistants who specialized in this 
area (although they also did some audit and tax work at peak pe­
riods). The partner in charge of the audit and/or tax work for a 
particular client supervised the activities of the management services 
group whenever they were called in on an assignment for that client.
Central Electrical Distributors, Inc.
Central Electrical Distributors, Inc., had been founded by Messrs. 
Lawrence and Barnett in the late 1930’s. Neither of the two men had 
had any significant experience in the electrical industry prior to their 
starting the company, but both had held a variety of administrative 
positions with industrial companies in the Detroit area. Both had 
had a strong desire to own their own business, and from personal 
and family resources were able to put together sufficient capital to 
start the venture. In 1965 all Central’s stock was still held by the 
Lawrence and Barnett families.
Lawrence and Barnett chose the electrical supply business simply 
because their observations had indicated a need and growing de­
mand for the services of this type of company. However, it was not 
until after the company’s first ten years of existence (covering first 
the difficult early years and then the dislocations of World War II) 
that real success was achieved. In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s 
sales expanded rapidly to over the $2 million level, with profits more 
than keeping pace. Little growth in sales was experienced after the 
mid-1950’s, however, and by the early 1960’s sales declines were ex­
perienced. In addition, profit margins were continually narrowing. 
In 1964 a loss of $105,000 was reported on sales of $1,900,000, bring­
ing total losses in the years 1962-1964 to $186,000. It was this sit­
uation which prompted Lawrence and Barnett to call on Jarrett, 
Farmer & Co. for help.
Central was primarily a wholesaler of industrial electrical equip­
ment. The company carried the branded lines of all the major elec­
trical equipment manufacturers, in most cases on a nonexclusive basis. 
Even where Central did have a franchise, its assigned territory was 
so much smaller than the practical trading area of other franchises 
in the Greater Detroit Metropolitan area that it felt the full force of
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competition. Central’s large customers were primarily construction 
companies and the maintenance departments of industrial companies, 
which would buy large quantities of replacement items on contracts 
calling for a defined minimum purchase over the contract period at 
negotiated prices. These accounts were mostly serviced by commis­
sion salesmen, with a few “house accounts.” Central also sold elec­
trical parts and equipment over the counter, typically in small trans­
actions, although it was fairly common for established customers to 
make large over-the-counter purchases without prior orders. In ad­
dition, Central maintained a small inventory of domestic appliances 
and lighting fixtures that were sold at regular retail prices. The retail 
activity was primarily a convenience for large customers, family and 
friends, and casual shoppers, and no attempt was made to carry a 
full line or to provide the display facilities and specialized sales per­
sonnel normally associated with the retailing of these items. Almost 
all retail business was conducted at the downtown store.
Operations were carried out at the main downtown store in Detroit 
(an old, company-owned, narrow four-story building in a congested 
commercial area) and at three suburban branch locations, in leased 
premises, in Dearborn, Oak Park, and Garden City, suburbs which 
were in a cluster about three miles from each other west of the city. 
These branches had been set up over the years with the intention of 
thereby providing better service for customers in these three areas.
Central’s Balance Sheet as of December 31, 1964, is shown in Ex­
hibit 1 (page 32) and Comparative Statements of Income for the three 
years through that date are shown in Exhibit 2 (page 33).
Defining the Engagement
In response to Mr. Lawrence’s question in the opening paragraph, 
Mr. Redington replied that he was always willing to help a client 
in any matter on which he felt professionally qualified. He then 
took a few minutes to explain the nature of the management services 
offered by Jarrett, Farmer and described how his firm had recently 
been involved in several engagements involving specialized skills in 
the fields of retail distribution and inventory controls. “As a result of 
our experience and knowledge in these areas,” Mr. Redington con­
cluded, “we have been helpful to several of our regular clients. Why 
don’t you tell me a little more about your problem as you see it, and 
then we’ll see whether we might be able to help you.”
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Mr. Lawrence agreed, and began by pointing out that the losses of 
the past three years had reduced Central’s equity by one-third. What 
he and Barnett had found particularly disturbing was the substantial 
deterioration in operations that had taken place in 1964, with sales 
down about 12½ per cent, gross margin down by 1.6 points and the 
operating loss almost tripled, compared with the previous year. They 
now felt that the situation was getting beyond their control. In 1963 
they had made strenuous attempts to improve their results, in reac­
tion to the loss reported for 1962; however, although they had suc­
ceeded in both raising gross margin and reducing expenses, the net 
effect of their efforts was simply to shave 1962’s loss only slightly, 
because of the sales decline. In fact, when they had delved into
Exhibit 1
CENTRAL ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. 
Balance Sheet 
December 31, 1964 
($000 Omitted)
Assets
Current assets
Cash $ 35
Accounts receivable (net) 328
Inventory 477
Fixed assets
Accumulated Book
Cost Depreciation Value
Land & buildings $119 $ 69 $ 50
Vehicles 32 16 16
Fixtures 32   30 2
$183 $115 $ 68
Prepayments and other assets 
Total Assets
$840
68 
___7
$915
Liabilities and Equity
Current liabilities
Accounts payable $338
Notes payable 228
Accruals 21
Stockholders’ equity
Total Liabilities and Equity
$587
328
$915
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1963’s results more closely they realized that the major difference 
between that year and the previous year was that in 1963 they had 
attempted to avoid the price cutting which was a normal character­
istic of their line of business. Since the major part of their sales 
consisted of branded equipment freely available from a multitude 
of sources within the Detroit area (many being ex-salesmen from 
Central who set up shoe-string operations and tried to hold “their” 
customers by discounting) it was often “necessary” to cut margins
Exhibit 2
CENTRAL ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. 
Comparative Statement of Income
For the Years Ended December 31, 1962-1964 
($000 Omitted)
Year Ended 
December 31,
Net sales
1962
$2,363
1963
$2,205
1964
$1,927
Cost of goods sold 1,881 1,736 1,548
Gross profit $ 482 $ 469 $ 379
Expenses:
Store salaries $ 173 $ 164 $ 136
Office salaries 81 74 77
Officers’ salaries 42 42 42
Salesmen’s salaries & expenses 75 75 81
Advertising 20 15 17
Rent & property expense 28 26 25
Travel 17 18 17
Auto & delivery expense 18 19 20
Insurance 15 18 15
Telephone 13 13 11
Taxes 14 14 12
Maintenance 12 10 10
Legal & accounting 6 6 7
Interest 10 10 11
Bad debts 2 2 3
Total Expenses $ 526 $ 506 $ 484
Net loss $ (44) $ (37) $(105)
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by half or more in order to get sales. Thus, Lawrence pointed out, 
“What we really did in 1963 was to eliminate $158,000 of ‘discount’ 
sales on which the gross margin was only $13,000, or about 8 per 
cent. However, this elimination of price cutting in 1963 produced 
very adverse reactions from a number of customers, and although we 
resumed the practice of meeting or even shading competitors’ prices 
in 1964, we’d have to admit that a good portion of 1964’s sales de­
cline is attributable to customers who took their business elsewhere 
because of dissatisfaction with the 1963 experiment.”
Lawrence explained that he and Barnett were very concerned about 
Central’s future. Obviously, things could not go on as they had been 
in recent years. If continuing losses were inevitable they both 
felt that they ought to consider liquidating the company while there 
was still a substantial equity remaining. They did not feel that they 
could take this step, however, without the benefit of an impartial 
review of their position by an outsider. They also felt that such a 
review might well produce a diagnosis of the company’s ills and a 
prescription for returning to profitability. Perhaps the solution was 
to change the nature of the business in some way, or to close down 
part of it. Whatever it was, Lawrence and Barnett felt that operating 
responsibilities and their close involvement with the business for the 
better part of their working lives made it difficult for them to under­
take this type of project personally (particularly in view of the ap­
parent results of their 1963 experiment in eliminating price cutting).
At the conclusion of Mr. Lawrence’s remarks Redington indicated 
that his firm would be glad to undertake such an assignment, and 
explained that it would be handled by members of the firm’s man­
agement services staff, working under his personal direction. As he 
saw it, the purpose of the investigation would be to:
1. Determine the causes of Central’s declining sales and profitability.
2. Based on the findings under item (1), define the alternative 
courses of action that appeared feasible and evaluate them to the 
extent necessary either to (a) recommend a specific course of action, 
or (b) propose a definite program for further work which would lead 
to an ultimate solution to the problem.
Redington estimated that this project would require three to four 
man-weeks of professional staff time which, together with supervision, 
would cost between $3,000 and $4,000. He indicated that work could
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begin the following week. Lawrence and Barnett accepted this pro­
posal and offered to provide all possible assistance to Redington’s men.
Questions
1. Lay out a work program for this assignment.
2. How would you determine whether part or all of Central’s oper­
ations should be liquidated?
3. What factors make for success in the electrical equipment dis­
tribution business? Is information of this type necessary for this as­
signment? If it is necessary, how might it be obtained?
Commentary on Central Electrical Distributors, Inc.
The Investigation
The following day Redington called into his office two of the firm’s 
management services men, Owen Lee and Keith Thomas, and ex­
plained the assignment to them. He instructed Lee to make a thor­
ough investigation of Central’s costs. Thomas was instructed to study 
the competitive situation. He told them: “Bearing in mind that Cen­
tral is primarily a wholesaler, I suspect that there is no point in trying 
to associate operating costs with product fines, (1) because in reality 
Central’s product is service and (2) because most of the costs can 
be so associated only by arbitrary allocations of dubious validity. 
The entity—the store—is the most important thing.
“Central is trying to provide several varieties of service, such as 
availability of inventory in four different locations, availability of in­
ventory in quantity at extremely short notice (when customers, es­
pecially contractors, come into the store with a large shopping fist 
and without prior notification or ordering), availability of retail mer­
chandise, and so on. Owen, what I want you to find out, as nearly 
as you can, is what it costs to provide all this service, and how much 
loss (or profit) is produced as a result, under whatever classifications 
seem to you to be appropriate after you’ve spent a day or two be­
coming familiar with the business. Keith, after you’ve familiarized 
yourself with the business, you should get out in the field and find 
out what’s going on in this industry. What do Central’s customers 
really want? Is Central operating in the best manner possible, given 
its customers’ needs? Why is Central losing business? Is there any-
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thing that Central could do to improve relations with its customers, 
and maybe increase sales?
Lee’s and Thomas’ Orientation Visits
Lee’s and Thomas’ first two days were spent in visiting Central’s 
main downtown store and the three branches, observing operations 
and questioning company personnel. As they expected, they found 
that the three branches were all scaled-down versions of the main 
store, carrying partial lines of items carried by the main store, ex­
cluding the slower-moving items. Lee learned that it was not un­
common for one customer to be ordering from more than one of 
Central’s locations at one time, usually because he required equip­
ment at more than one construction site or plant. In some cases a 
single order would be serviced from more than one store because no 
single store carried sufficient inventory of the item in question to fill 
the order. In those cases, in order to avoid multiple shipments to the 
customers, the furthest store would ship its portion of the order to 
the nearest store, which would then complete and bill the order. 
There was no automatic means for individual store personnel to know 
whether the other stores could help them service orders that exceeded 
their inventory on any item; normal procedure was for the salespeople 
involved to telephone the other stores (or suppliers) and to check on 
the availability of items needed urgently. Central maintained a regular 
shuttle service by truck between the downtown store and the branches, 
catering, among other things, to the constant need for inter-store ship­
ments. Lee ascertained that it was a rare day when there were no 
shipments to a store from each of the other stores, and that it was by 
no means uncommon for the same item to be shipped inter-store in 
opposite directions within the space of a week or two.
Both Lee and Thomas were amazed at the conditions prevailing 
at the downtown store. The building (which Central owned) was 
old, four stories high, and very narrow. The first floor contained two 
selling areas—one area for (wholesale) electrical equipment and the 
other area, with some cluttered display space, for appliances and 
other retail items. At the rear of the first floor was the shipping area. 
This area was accessible through an alley wide enough for one truck 
at a time. The offices were situated in the front half of the second 
floor; the remainder of the second floor, and all of the third and fourth 
floors, were used for inventory storage. There was a freight elevator 
at the back of the building, and a wide staircase; both bore heavy 
traffic continuously as shipments came in and out. When Thomas
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pointed out that identical items were stored on more than one floor, 
he was told that the inventory clerks knew the location of all inven­
tory; that incoming inventory was deposited in any convenient place 
if there was not sufficient space wherever existing supplies of such 
items were located; and that the storemen rarely had time to shift 
and group like items together once they had been received. No per­
petual inventory records were maintained. One storeman admitted 
to Thomas that sometimes it was “easier” to feign an out-of-stock 
position (and to call the merchandise in from a branch) than to 
search for, find, and bring out the small items stored in out-of-the- 
way or hard-to-reach locations.
Generally speaking, the storage and inventory control problems 
were far less severe at the three branches, even though none kept 
perpetual inventory records. All three branches were in single-story 
layouts, with open racks and bins arranged in some semblance of or­
der and with sufficient space to hold all items of one type together 
in one space. Visually, the main problem at each branch seemed to 
be the limited range of merchandise carried; this seemed inconsistent 
with the downtown store situation, where space and layout problems 
were subordinated to the need to find room for large quantities and 
varieties of merchandise. For no apparent or determinable reason a 
policy seemed to exist at the branches of placing orderliness and 
calm paramount to complete coverage of the various lines Central 
carried.
Owen Lee’s Analysis of Central’s Costs
On the third day Lee and Thomas split up, to concentrate on their 
respective assignments. Lee decided to analyze Central’s costs by 
store location, with a separate breakout of costs related to retail sales. 
Since retail sales amounted to only $60,000 in 1964 ( 3 per cent of 
sales) he decided initially not to bother to split retail sales by store. 
Lee recalled that Redington had also suggested an analysis of the cost 
of the “service” of quantity availability on extremely short notice; at 
this stage he could not see how this was to be done, so he decided 
to proceed with the analysis by location and to get back to this other 
problem later if he still felt it necessary to do so.
Lee’s first step was to analyze the company’s sales and billing rec­
ords for the past three years in order to determine sales by store. 
Inter-branch shipments to a branch requiring the merchandise for de­
livery on an order were treated as external sales by the branch dealing 
with the customer, and as inter-branch items (handled at cost by both
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branches involved). The results of this analysis are shown in Exhibits 
3, 4, and 5 (pages 38, 39 and 40, respectively), which also includes 
Lee’s expenses analysis, described step-by-step below.
Exhibit 3
CENTRAL ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC.
Sales and Expense Analysis
Year Ended December 31, 1962 
($000 Omitted)
Net sales
Down­
town
$1,411
Dear­
born
$409
Oak
Park
$286
Garden
City
$194
Re­
tail
$63
Unallo­
cated Total
$2,363
Cost of goods sold1
Direct purchases $1,335 $289 $108 $102 $47 $1,881
Inter-co. purchases2 211 64 161 84 — 520
Inter-co. sales2 (415) (34) (41) (30) — (520)
Total cost of goods
sold $1,131 $319 $228 $156 $47 $1,881
Gross profit $ 280 $ 90 $ 58 $ 38 $16 $ 482
Per cent of sales 19.8 22.0 20.3 19.6 25.4 20.4
Expenses
Store Salaries $ 105 $ 30 $ 20 $ 14 $ 4 $ $ 173
Office salaries 81 81
Officers’ salaries 42 42
Salesmen’s salaries
& expenses 32 16 15 12 75
Advertising 20 20
Rent & property expense 15 5 4 4 28
Travel 17 17
Auto & delivery expense 11 2 3 2 18
Insurance 10 2 2 1 15
Telephone 7 2 2 2 13
Taxes 8 2 2 2 14
Maintenance 8 2 1 1 12
Legal & accounting 6 6
Interest 10 10
Bad debts 2 2
Total expenses $ 196 $ 61 $ 49 $ 38 $ 4 $ 178 $ 526
Net income (loss) $ 84 $ 29 $ 9 — $12 $(178) $ (44)
1 Assumes all intra-company items flow through to sales; i.e., do not remain in inventory.
2 At cost.
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Turning to the expenses reported on Central’s income statements, 
Lee first identified those items which by their nature were common 
to the whole organization; i.e., unallocable to particular locations.
Exhibit 4
CENTRAL ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. 
Sales and Expense Analysis 
Year Ended December 31, 1963 
($000 Omitted)
Net sales
Down­
town
$1,144
Dear­
born
$530
Oak
Park
$301
Garden
City
$175
Re­
tail
$55
Unallo­
cated Total
$2,205
Cost of goods sold1
Direct purchases $1,201 $311 $ 92 $ 94 $35 $1,736
Inter-co. purchases2 186 120 180 80 — 566
Inter-co. sales2 (475) (22) (36) (33) — (566)
Total cost of goods
sold $ 912 $409 $239 $141 $35 $1,736
Gross profit $ 232 $121 $ 62 $ 34 $20 $ 469
Per cent of sales 20.2 22.8 20.6 19.4 36.4 21.3
Expenses
Store salaries $ 87 $ 36 $ 22 $ 15 $ 4 $ $ 164
Office salaries 74 74
Officers’ salaries 42 42
Salesmen’s salaries
& expenses 32 16 15 12 75
Advertising 15 15
Rent & property expense 14 4 4 4 26
Travel 18 18
Auto & delivery expense 10 4 3 2 19
Insurance 12 2 2 2 18
Telephone 8 2 1 2 13
Taxes 8 2 2 2 14
Maintenance 6 2 1 1 10
Legal & accounting 6 6
Interest 10 10
Bad debts 2 2
Total expenses $ 177 $ 68 $ 50 $ 40 $ 4 $ 167 $ 506
Net income (loss) $ 55 $ 53 $ 12 $ (6) $16 $(167) $ (37)
1 Assumes all intra-company items flow through to sales; i.e., do not remain in inventory.
2 At cost.
39
This category included office salaries and officers’ salaries, advertis­
ing, travel (as distinct from salesmen s expenses and delivery expense, 
which were allocable), legal and accounting, interest and bad debts. 
Several expense categories could be allocated directly, Lee found 
when he continued. For example, store salaries presented no problem,
Exhibit 5
CENTRAL ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC.
Sales and Expense Analysis
Year Ended December 31, 1964 
($000 Omitted)
Net sales
Down­
town 
$ 927
Dear­
born
$511
Oak
Park
$275
Garden
City
Re­
tail
Unallo­
cated Total
$154 $60 $1,927
Cost of goods sold1
Direct purchases $1,119 $255 $ 98 $ 30 $46 $1,548
Inter-co. purchases2 151 191 210 130 — 682
Inter-co. sales2 (516) (44) .(87) (35) — (682)
Total cost of goods
sold $ 754 $402 $221 $125 $46 $1,548
Gross profit $ 173 $109 $ 54 $ 29 $14 $ 379
Per cent of sales 18.7 21.3 19.5 19.0 23.3 19.7
Expenses
Store salaries $ 66 $ 33 $ 20 $ 13 $ 4 $ $ 136
Office salaries 77 77
Officers’ salaries 42 42
Salesmen’s salaries
& expenses 36 16 15 14 81
Advertising 17 17
Rent & property expense 13 4 3 5 25
Travel 17 17
Auto & delivery expense 10 4 3 3 20
Insurance 9 2 2 2 15
Telephone 6 2 1 2 11
Taxes 6 2 2 2 12
Maintenance 6 2 1 1 10
Legal & accounting 7 7
Interest 11 11
Bad debts 3 3
Total expenses $ 152 $ 65 $ 47 $ 42 $ 4 $ 174 $ 484
Net income (loss) $ 21 $ 44 $ 7 $(13) $10 $(174)i $(105)
1 Assumes all intra-company items flow through to sales; i.e., do not remain in inventory.
2 At cost.
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as there was no question where store personnel worked. The annual 
allocation of $4,000 store salaries against retail sales represented the 
cost of one “average” salesperson, based on an estimate of the man­
ager of the downtown store that, on the average, one person was in­
volved with retail sales constantly. Retail sales in the branches were 
so negligible as to make allocation of personnel time worthless. On 
salesmen’s salaries and expenses, Lee’s first reaction was that this 
item was a common expense, but on checking with Harold Lawrence 
he ascertained that individual salesmen were attached to specific 
stores and billed their sales through those stores. Rent and property 
expense presented no problem, since adequate records existed indi­
cating the store location in question for each payment.
Auto and delivery expense was incurred primarily to move mer­
chandise between stores, and to make deliveries to customers. Lee 
therefore decided to allocate this item in proportion to each store’s 
contribution to total traffic; i.e., net sales plus sales to other stores 
plus purchases from other stores. While this procedure appeared to 
double-count intra-company traffic, the effect was to split the alloca­
tion between the shipping and receiving store. For example, for the 
downtown store, in 1962, the allocation was arrived at as follows:
$1,411 +  211 +  415
$2,363 +  520 +  520 X $18,000 =
$2 037
$3,403 X $18,000 =  $11,000 (rounded)
This allocation method would have been adversely affected if the 
proportion of nondelivered sales was vastly different as between in­
dividual stores, but Lee felt that any additional precision obtained by 
allowing for this refinement would be minimal, and not worth the 
additional time.
Insurance, telephone, taxes, and maintenance were all expenses 
that could be attributed to specific stores either because of direct 
billing to or incurrence by each store (telephone and maintenance) 
or because the expense could be related to a store’s assets, sales vol­
ume, or other empirical quantities (insurance and taxes).
When he had completed his cost allocation, Lee totaled his figures 
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and determined the net profit from each store. He summarized his 
analysis as follows:
1. Gross margins have been consistently trending down at Garden 
City, consistently below the company average at the downtown store, 
and consistently above average at Dearborn.
2. Sales trends have been fairly strong at Dearborn, moderately 
weak at Garden City and very weak at the downtown store.
3. Margins tend to fluctuate widely on retail sales, but sales volume 
is quite steady. Since the only expense directly attributable to this 
“department” is the cost of one salesperson in the downtown store, 
retail sales are marginally very profitable given the present situation.
4. The profit contribution from the downtown store has been shrink­
ing rapidly, and at the present rate of decline could be negative in 
1965.
5. The Garden City store is becoming more and more unprofitable.
6. Dearborn has become the most profitable unit in the company, 
and Oak Park is consistently profitable, on a very small scale.
7. Common or unallocated expenses have remained roughly con­
stant at about $170,000 per year despite the decreases in sales vol­
ume of the past two years.
Keith Thomas’ Evaluation of Central’s Competitive Situation
Thomas’ first move was to confer with William Barnett, Central’s 
Executive Vice President, and, with his assistance, drew up a list of 
Central’s major competitors, and its major customers. Thomas spot­
ted each one on a large map of the Greater Detroit Metropolitan 
area, and found that there was a concentration of competitors in the 
downtown area, and a fairly wide scattering of competitors in the 
suburban industrial areas. To Barnett’s surprise, Thomas also observed 
that Central’s customers were for the most part widely spaced about 
the suburban industrial areas, with very few downtown. Barnett 
pointed out to Thomas that in the case of contractors or construction 
jobs Central’s cutomers tended to move about over a period of time; 
a big new building downtown could, for example, mean a large vol­
ume of sales from the downtown store for a short period of time. 
Thomas asked Barnett why some 50 per cent of Central’s sales were
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made at the downtown store; Barnett replied that he had never 
thought about this question, but he supposed that the answer lay in 
the fact that many old customers were used to dealing with the down­
town store, two of Central’s five salesmen were attached to the down­
town store, and it was sometimes more convenient to service orders 
from downtown because of the extent and variety of the inventory 
there, even if the customer were located nearer to a branch. (This 
procedure would only occur where the branch itself was not directly 
involved in the order.)
Thomas next undertook a tour around the Detroit area, visually 
inspecting all of Central’s competitors that he had listed with Bar­
nett’s help, and going into the stores where this seemed to be worth 
doing. (By the time the engagement was over Thomas possessed 
one of Detroit’s largest private collections of minor miscellaneous 
electrical equipment.) Again, Thomas found a clear dichotomy be­
tween the downtown and suburban competitors. The downtown 
stores were typically located in rundown, multi-story buildings much 
like Central’s own. Several of them approached or even exceeded 
the state of confusion which was characteristic of Central’s down­
town store. In the suburban areas, Thomas found that Central’s 
competitors all occupied single story premises, as Central did, but 
that most of their units were larger than Central’s. The most out­
standing competitor was in Garden City—a large, well-laid out store 
humming with activity and, judging from the traffic at the multiple 
berth loading gate and in the parking lot, doing a high volume of 
business. Almost all of Central’s suburban competitors carried more 
complete lines than Central did in its own suburban stores; those that 
did not were usually part of a chain like Central with a main office 
elsewhere.
Without making any specific counts or surveys, Thomas came to 
the conclusion that Central’s suburban competitors were doing far 
better in sales than Central was, and that the larger, the more mod­
em and the more full-range the competing store, the better it seemed 
to be doing. Thomas managed to strike up a conversation with office 
and sales personnel in some of the competing stores, and came away 
with the impression that none of them was feeling any sales or margin 
squeeze. Thomas realized that it was unlikely that anyone would ad­
mit to trouble or complain about declining business to a stranger, 
but felt that his visual observations tended to bear out the impres­
sions he had received as a result of talking to these people. One 
source of data which substantiated Thomas’ observations was credit
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reports which he obtained from Dun and Bradstreet. These reports 
indicated that most of Central’s competitors were in the same net 
worth category as Central, that their credit ratings were generally 
good, and two or three reports stated that the sales volume was in­
creasing. Other facts that Thomas gleaned from his tour and con­
versations were that the larger, more obviously successful suburban 
stores were of quite recent construction; that where these stores had 
replaced downtown locations it had become much easier to service 
customer orders working in uncramped space and with delivery ve­
hicles unhampered by traffic; and that some stores had successfully 
experimented with a supermarket (self-service) type of layout for 
in-store sales, cutting labor costs and apparently increasing customer 
satisfaction.
Thomas’ next step was to set up visits to a broad cross-section of 
Central’s customers, preceded in each case by a telephone call from 
Lawrence or Barnett to introduce him. Thomas explained quite 
frankly to each customer whom he visited that Central was looking for 
ways of improving its service to its customers, and would welcome 
suggestions and complaints. The response by and large was quite 
appreciative, and the specific points raised were no surprise to Thomas, 
given the picture already forming in his mind about Central’s in­
dustry and the way the company carried out its role. After com­
pleting his interviews, Thomas tabulated what he felt to be the most 
useful points raised, in order of concern to those interviewed (most 
concerned listed first):
1. Central’s deliveries were getting slower and slower, particularly 
from the downtown store (some of the customers interviewed vol­
unteered that they had much better delivery service from some of 
the new suburban stores).
2. Central’s salesmen and store personnel don’t seem to know wheth­
er they have particular items in stock or not, or in sufficient quantity 
to meet large orders.
3. It was very difficult, because of traffic, to get to the downtown 
store, where Central maintained its biggest variety of inventory.
4. Central’s main distribution point (the downtown store) is fur­
ther away from the bulk of its customers than many competitors.
5. Central occasionally shipped incorrect merchandise or incorrect 
quantities; rectifying the situation was usually a lengthy process.
44
CENTRAL ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC.
6. Central did not seem to be innovation-minded, while many of 
its competitors were.
Report to Central
A little over a week after they first met with Redington, Lee and 
Thomas met with him again to report their findings, as described 
above. The three men discussed Central’s situation for some hours, 
until they had reached complete unanimity on their recommendations. 
Redington requested that Lee and Thomas draft a report to Central 
for his review. Two days later the following draft reached his desk:
DRAFT
TO: CENTRAL ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC.
FROM: JARRETT, FARMER & CO.
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF OPERATIONS AND RECOMMENDA­
TIONS
Summary: We recommend that management begin a detailed investi­
gation and development of an orderly plan leading to (1) closing the 
company’s downtown and Garden City facilities, and (2) expanding 
the Dearborn store to provide capacity for the bulk or all of the 
company’s sales volume. This investigation should also explore the 
possibility of closing the Oak Park facility.
Our initial analysis of this proposal, described below, indicates 
that it is feasible and has the potential for restoring profitable opera­
tions. Other alternatives involving less drastic action, such as an ex­
pansion or contraction of the line of products handled, appear in­
adequate to reverse the current losses and would ultimately lead to 
insolvency. Voluntary liquidation at this time is unnecessary and 
undesirable, considering the opportunities available if the facilities 
are reorganized as recommended.
Present Situation
Our analysis of the company’s present situation is as follows:
1. Sales are declining because of the inefficiencies imposed by the 
company’s operating structure. Specifically, orders are being lost be­
cause of delivery and inventory control problems, while competitors
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are moving into modem facilities where neither space nor traffic is a 
problem.
2. The nature of the company’s market is now such that a multi­
plicity of small units is no longer desirable. Customers are better 
served by fast delivery from a central distribution point than by slow 
delivery ( traffic problems) from a downtown store and/or order-filling 
delays (inadequate inventory) from small local stores.
3. The company’s multiplicity of units is too expensive to operate 
(particularly in personnel costs) to compete with the low-overhead, 
large suburban stores coming into existence.
Industry Trend
We see the dominant trend in your industry being the movement 
toward a large single-story unit with supermarket-type layout, pro­
viding easy visual control over inventory and offering significant per­
sonnel cost savings. Coupled with this unit must be an efficient de­
livery system since speed (or availability) is of the essence when 
selling a branded product in a highly competitive market. This 
indicates a need for a multi-unit transport fleet rather than a few 
large-capacity trucks.
Note: It is difficult to quantify the cost of providing the “speed” ele­
ment in customer service. It can be said, however, that Central will 
be able to give better, faster service and probably at lower cost if it 
concentrates the bulk or all its order-filling at a location that provides 
for (1) easy accessibility and movement of inventory within the 
store, and (2) rapid transportation from store to customer (i.e., 
avoidance of downtown traffic delays except when downtown delivery 
is required, when all competitors would have the same problem).
Solution Suggested
1. Close Garden City store (losing money on direct income and 
expense alone) and also downtown store (contribution trend sharply 
down and physical features all negative). Also consider closing Oak 
Park store (self-sufficient in terms of contribution but is a small unit 
and therefore a diversion, and the service it provides would probably 
be provided equally as well by the new unit proposed below).
2. Set up new headquarters in a suburban location, preferably by 
expanding the already successful Dearborn store. New store would
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be single-story construction, allowing for easy access to and visual 
control of inventory, and also for ease of shipment to customers since 
this one location would be (a) in a noncongested area and (b) would 
handle all or nearly all sales. It is probable that some sales volume 
would be lost in transferring to a new suburban location but the at­
tached projections (Exhibit 6, pages 48 and 49) show that operations 
would break even at a sales volume that is significantly lower than 
1964’s depressed level, and that seems quite capable of being reached.
Effect of Suggested Solution
1. Downtown building can be sold. Since book value represents 
cost over 20 years ago, and since downtown property is much sought 
after, sale of property would probably produce a significant profit, 
and the proceeds would materially strengthen Central’s rather weak 
cash position.
2. Total inventory can probably be reduced, since there will no 
longer be any need to keep duplicated lines of staple items. At the 
same time inventory control will be facilitated, because all inventory 
will be both visible and easily accessible.
3. Order filling and delivery should be easier at and from the new 
main store. This should enhance customer service.
4. Salesmen’s efforts can be more closely watched and co-ordinated. 
The total sales force could probably be reduced by one man without 
any harmful effect. This is based on the present unavoidable dupli­
cation caused by having at least one salesman working out of each 
store.
5. The breakeven point will be lowered substantially; estimated 
sales volume will produce a profit.
6. The new location in a suburb will undoubtedly result in the loss 
of some business in areas located at a distance from Dearborn (for­
merly more conveniently served from other stores) and in higher 
delivery costs on some of the retained sales.
Further Analysis Needed
Our tentative analysis of the profitability of this proposal (Exhibit 
6) is intended merely to demonstrate its general feasibility. The 
profitability hinges on several key estimates and assumptions which 
should be carefully reviewed by management and translated into
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a more specific, time-phased sequence of actions. The critical areas 
are:
1. Sales volume. The total volume will drop by only 10 per cent, 
as a  net effect of losing 20 per cent of the volume from the downtown 
store offset by a 10 per cent increase at Dearborn.
2. Gross margins. A 10 per cent improvement (2 percentage points) 
should be possible because of better inventory control, fewer lost
Exhibit 6
CENTRAL ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC.
Pro Forma Statement of Income 
Year Ended December 31, 1964
($000 Omitted)
Basis for
Sales
Actual Pro Forma Pro Forma
Downtown $ 927 $ 738 Reduction of approxi­
mately 21%
Dearborn 511 562 Increase of 10%
Oak Park 275 247 Reduction of approxi­
mately 10% if 
closed
Garden City 154 140 Reduction of approxi­
mately 10%
Retail 60 60
Total sales $1,927 $1,747
Less direct cost of sales $1,548 $1,363
Gross margin $ 379 $ 384
Per cent of sales 19.7% 22% Assume 22% due to 
better control, less 
opportunity for pil­
ferage, better prices 
for better services
Less direct (variable) expenses
Store salaries
Salesmen's salaries and
$ 136 $ 82 Reduced by 40%
expenses 81 65 Reduction of one
salesman
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sales, and somewhat better prices reflecting improved customer serv­
ice.
3. Store and office salaries. Closing two of the current four stores, 
coupled with increased efficiency due to layout at Dearborn, should 
permit a substantial reduction in payroll. The Dearborn expansion 
needs to be designed in detail, and a staffing pattern for it developed, 
before accurate estimates of payroll savings are possible. At this early 
stage in the analysis, we have used rough percentage estimates to 
reflect the magnitude of the savings that should be possible.
Exhibit 6, continued
Basis for
Actual Pro Forma Pro Forma
Rent and property 25 25
Auto and delivery 20 20
Insurance 15 12 20% reduction 
Reduced approxi­
mately 50% 
Reduced approxi­
mately 20% 
Reduced by 20%
Telephone 11 6
Taxes 12 10
Maintenance 10 8
Total direct expenses $ 310 $ 228
Marginal income $ 69 $ 156
Less period (fixed) expenses
Office salaries $ 77 $ 62 Reduction of approxi­
mately 20%
Officers’ salaries 42 42
Advertising 17 17
Travel 17 17
Legal and accounting 7 7
Interest 11 Eliminated by paying 
off notes upon sale 
of property
Bad debts 3 3
Total period expenses $ 174 $ 148
Net income (loss) $ (105) $ 8
49
4. Rent and property expense. Again, a more accurate estimate of 
these costs for the new program must be based on more detailed 
plans. On balance, these costs should show little change.
Much of the detailed planning necessary to implement this proposal 
must be performed by management, but we would be pleased to 
provide any continuing assistance that may be desired.
Conclusion
After reviewing the draft report and making some minor changes, 
Mr. Redington telephoned Messrs. Lawrence and Barnett to arrange 
to discuss his recommendations. An appointment was made for later 
that week. Redington hoped that the analysis and proposals he 
planned to present would be regarded as encouraging and helpful 
by the two men. Redington recognized (1) that the analyses and 
suggestions made little sense if the “new Central” were not profitable, 
(2) that the calculation showing that it would be profitable (Exhibit 
6) depended on a whole complex of assumptions, slight variations in 
which would throw the projection into a loss, and (3) that the pro­
jected profit was not, at present at least, high enough to be attractive 
for the long run. He planned, therefore, to review and check these 
assumptions carefully with Lawrence and Barnett in detail. Overall, 
however, Redington felt that at a minimum the report did suggest 
a way of making a vast improvement in the company’s situation and 
that it did contain the added protection that future growth in the 
Dearborn area would improve rather than detract from the projected 
results.
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McCarthy-Halliday, Inc.
The CPA firm of Gifford, Buckley & Co., of Worcester, Mass., had 
been founded in 1933 by Richard T. Gifford and Edward J. Buckley. 
In 1964 the firm had a total personnel of forty, including eight 
partners and seventeen other CPAs. The firm was one of the largest 
in Worcester, and had a wide variety of industrial and commercial 
clients. Messrs. Gifford and Buckley, both now nearing retirement, 
were prominent members of the Massachusetts Society of CPAs and 
their reputation had attracted clients from as far away as the western 
suburbs of Boston. The firm’s revenue was derived approximately 
one-half from audit work and approximately one-quarter each from 
taxes and management services. The partners felt that it was rather 
unusual for a comparatively small firm such as theirs to derive 25 
per cent of its revenue from management services, but attributed this 
to the fact that a major part of this income reflected the firm’s 
specialization in providing services for automobile dealerships.
Gifford, Buckley & Co. served approximately 170 automobile dealers 
in western Massachusetts, nearly all of them franchised by one or 
more of the car divisions of one of the “Big Three” in the automobile 
industry. Most of the dealer clients were on an annual retainer, billed 
monthly, whereby the firm was engaged to perform auditing and tax 
functions and to consult with the management on operating and 
other problems. Depending upon the individual clients’ requirements, 
the firm visited its clients monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, or semi­
annually. A typical arrangement with an automobile dealership 
provided for three quarterly contacts with the client of three man-days 
each, plus a fourth quarterly contact involving four man-days of work. 
Each of these contacts included two man-days of a senior staff 
member’s time. In addition, the client’s tax return would be prepared 
at the end of the year. As a general service to its automobile dealer
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clients the firm also had prepared a number of operations guides for 
dealership accounting, and occasionally circulated bulletins to its 
dealer clients giving them news of tax and other developments that 
affected them. All of the firm’s dealer clients used a standardized 
chart of accounts, and standardized accounting and reporting forms, 
as recommended by the manufacturer.
McCarthy-Halliday, Inc.
McCarthy-Halliday, Inc., was the only dealer for its make of car 
in Ralston, Massachusetts, a city with a population of some 35,000. 
There was no other “same make” dealer within a 25-mile radius of 
Ralston. The town had once been an important textile manufacturing 
center, but with the decline of the New England textile industry, 
many of the plants in Ralston had shut down, and the remaining 
ones operated on a much reduced scale. Evan McCarthy and Vic 
Halliday had purchased the dealership in 1957, and had been clients 
of Gifford, Buckley & Co. since that time. Prior to taking over the 
dealership, the two men had been on the dealership’s sales staff. 
They had bought the business as a going concern when the owner 
had acquired a larger dealership in Worcester, Massachusetts. The 
previous owner had also been a client of Gifford, Buckley & Co., and 
had recommended that Messrs. McCarthy and Halliday continue the 
relationship. Under the annual retainer arrangement, the dealership 
received a quarterly review of their internally prepared monthly 
financial statements, annual income tax return preparation and tax 
advice, and the other services that the CPA firm provided to its auto­
mobile dealer clients. The understanding was that these services 
would usually require two man-days per quarter three times per year, 
and three man-days in the fourth quarter, as well as miscellaneous 
amounts of office time. The “quarterly review” included follow-up or 
investigation of specific questions or problem areas and a discussion 
of proposed solutions.
Financial statements for the dealership are reproduced in the follow­
ing exhibits:
Exhibit 1—Balance Sheet, July 31, 1964, page 53.
Exhibit 2—Statements of Income for 1962 and 1963, and for seven 
months of 1964, pages 54-56.
Exhibit 3—Departmental Gross Profit Analysis for the same periods 
as Exhibit 2, pages 57 and 58.
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Exhibit 1
McCARTHY-HALLIDAY, INC.
Interim Balance Sheet
July 31, 1964 
ASSETS
Current assets
Cash .........................................................
Accounts and notes receivable .............
Less allowance for doubtful accounts 
Inventories
New ca rs ..............................................
Used ca rs..............................................
Parts .....................................................
Accessories, gas, etc............................
Work-in-process (labor) ...................
Total inventories ...........................
Due from finance companies .................
Prepaid expenses ....................................
Total current assets .......................
Fixed assets
Furniture, fixtures & equipment .........
Service c a r ...............................................
Leasehold improvements ......................
Total fixed assets ...............................
Other assets .................................................
Total assets .........................................
$ 5,640
$21,207
3,393 17,814
$49,628
22,001
9,879
2,110
1,164
84,782
16,704
1,143
Cost
Allowance for 
Depreciation
$126,083
$19,296 $13,196 $ 6,100
1,892 1,514 378
3,674 1,511 2,163
$24,862 $16,221 $ 8,641
$ 454
$135,178
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Current liabilities
Accounts payable .......................................................................................  $ 8,189
Customer deposits ...................................................................................... 1,948
Service contract deposits ...........................................................................  1,894
Notes payable (cars) .................................................................................  50,590
Accrued taxes (other than income tax) ................................................ 7,119
Other accruals ............................................................................................ 2,645
Total current liabilities........................................................................... $ 72,385
Bank loan ........................................................................................................  4,160
Total liabilities ...................................................................................  $ 76,545
Stockholders’ equity
Capital stock ..............................................................................................  $ 50,000
Retained earnings ...................................................................................... 8,633
Total equity ........................................................................................ $ 58,633
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity .......................................  $135,178
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When Mr. John Stanley, a senior on the staff of Gifford, Buckley 
& Co., visited McCarthy-Halliday in August 1964, he followed his 
normal procedure of first reviewing the dealership’s financial state­
ments for the three-month period since his previous visit. After 
checking into a few questions that occured to him while he was look­
ing at the statements, he discussed them with Evan McCarthy and 
Vic Halliday. During this discussion, McCarthy told Stanley that he 
would like to “once again raise the old question of the situation in 
the body shop. As you know,” McCarthy went on, “our accounting 
statements have shown consistent losses in this department for several 
years. A couple of years ago, you’ll recall, you helped us analyze the 
operating efficiency and internal control procedures for the body shop, 
and the result was that the loss in 1962 was less than the loss in 1961. 
We showed a further improvement in 1963 due to the general tighten­
ing up. I think we’ve gone about as far as we can go in that direction, 
however, and we still lost about $4,500 in 1963. Now, the situation 
appears to be worsening again and we show a loss of more than $3,200 
for the first seven months of this year.
“Vic and I have discussed this,” McCarthy continued, “and we 
recognize that one solution is just to try harder to run that shop 
efficiently. But we suspect that our time would be more profitable if 
devoted to new and used car sales. The other alternative, other than 
just living with a continuing loss, is to close the body shop. That’s 
a tough decision, and we’re not sure which way we want to jump, but 
we thought you might work up some figures for us that would help. 
In particular, we’re not sure whether the loss reported by our account­
ing system is a true loss in the sense that it could all be avoided if 
the body shop were closed.” Stanley agreed to look into the matter 
and asked them to discuss it further with him at lunch, later that day.
Stanley knew that the body shop loss reported on the dealership’s 
financial statements was obviously influenced by the accounting 
methods used to produce departmental operating results. He wanted 
to be sure that there were no arbitrary or inaccurate figures in the 
body shop income statement that were biasing the reported financial 
results one way or the other.
Before doing any specific analysis, Mr. Stanley decided to spend a 
few minutes mentally reviewing the structure of McCarthy-Halliday, 
Inc., based on his file notes and personal knowledge of its operations.
The dealership’s main premises were at 301 Washington Street in 
Ralston; the body shop was located in a separate, small building, half 
a block away, at 23514 Washington Street. Both locations were under
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lease. The main premises consisted of a modem building with show­
room, offices, parts department and service bays. The building had 
been constructed for the dealership in 1959 under a twenty-year 
lease, with renewal options. The location was a desirable one for the 
oar sales activities, but the parcel of land was too small to permit 
a building large enough to house all the dealership’s activities. As 
a result, the body shop had been moved to the nearest available 
separate location. The body shop building, which had been leased in 
September 1959 when the new building was built, was an old, 
general-purpose structure and had required only minimal alterations 
when McCarthy-Halliday had moved in. It had been leased initially 
for a five-year term, with 3 five-year renewal options exercisable any 
time prior to expiration. There was no office as such in the body shop 
building; all administrative matters were handled from the showroom 
office half a block away. Because it was in a separate building, the 
body shop’s utilities were all independent of, and billed separately 
from, utilities on the main premises.
The dealership actually had a very small investment in the body 
shop as such. Most of the tools, equipment and fixtures were old, 
and by 1964 heavily depreciated. (Based on the 1963 year-end work 
papers Stanley estimated that the net investment in these items as of 
July 1964 was approximately $1,000, representing less than 20 per 
cent of cost. At an insurance appraisal in March 1964 these assets 
had been given a market value of $1,023. Replacement value was 
close to $7,000, new.) None of the leasehold improvements shown 
on the Balance Sheet applied to the body shop. Inventories (labor 
work-in-progress), accounts receivable and payable, and accruals, 
naturally included amounts applicable to the body shop’s activities. 
These items totaled approximately $2,000 for assets and $1,000 for 
liabilities at both December 31, 1962 and 1963, and Stanley did not 
believe that this relationship had changed during 1964.
For purposes of internal accounting, the body shop was regarded 
as being part of the service department. The main activity of the 
service department was regular service on customers’ cars, warranty 
service, checking out new cars prior to delivery, and reconditioning 
used cars for the used car department (in which the body shop played 
a major part). Even though the body shop was part of the service 
department, its activities were accounted for separately insofar as any 
transactions applied directly to it.
Other departments were new car department, the used car de­
partment ( selling both trade-ins and used cars purchased from whole­
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sale dealers), and the parts-accessories department (providing parts 
for engine and body repairs, for service, and for sale to independent 
service stations requiring genuine factory parts. Body parts accounted 
for about 25 per cent of total internal parts sales). Interdepartmental 
and trade billing arrangements were as follows:
Labor-internal—90 per cent of retail 
external1—80 per cent of retail
Repair parts-intemal—100 per cent of retail 
external1—80 per cent of retail
Because of its separate location, the body shop’s direct labor force 
was an entirely separate group from the service department and 
other activities located in the main premises. The cost of direct labor 
shown in the body shop’s income statement reflected only those 
employees working exclusively in the body shop. Body shop labor 
was expensive in Ralston because there was somewhat of a shortage 
of sufficiently skilled and trained people in this field. This was a 
particular problem with McCarthy-Hafliday because it was one of 
the few local dealerships with its own body shop. There were five 
independent body shops in or around Ralston, servicing both retail 
customers and most of the town’s other automobile dealers on a 
sub-contract basis. ( McCarthy-Halliday occasionally did some sub­
contract body shop work for other dealers at regular trade rates for 
the area, but this was insignificant in amount.) On the average 
McCarthy-Halliday had three men working in the body shop. In 
addition, one of the men in the regular service department, Murphy, 
was skilled in body finishing operations. Murphy handled any touch- 
up work that was required in preparing new cars for delivery to 
customers, and his time was charged as a part of the general prepara­
tion activity in the service department. If a new car was damaged 
in transit to an extent that major body work was required, it was re­
turned to the factory. Thus, the body shop was not involved in the 
handling of new cars prior to delivery.
Supervision of the body shop was provided by one of the dealer­
ship’s four supervisors. All other personnel costs charged to the body 
shop represented the cost of personnel working there exclusively 
except for owners’ and clerical salaries, which were allocated at 
10 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. These percentages repre­
1 To other members of the trade.
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sented the owners’ best estimates of the amount of time spent on 
body shop matters by the people involved.
With respect to other costs, Stanley found that the semi-separate 
existence of the body shop meant that almost all the costs charged 
to it were directly attributable to it and would not have been in­
curred had it not been in existence. The only exceptions were obvious 
combined overhead items such as advertising, contributions and legal 
and audit fees. The only expense item requiring further analysis was 
insurance; Stanley examined the dealership’s coverage and finally 
concluded that no more than half the insurance charged to the body 
shop was specifically attributable to its operation. The balance was 
corporate coverage that had been arbitrarily assigned to each of the 
divisions.
First Discussion With McCarthy and Halliday
At lunch that day Stanley discussed the body shop situation with 
the two partners. Looking at the nonfinancial aspects, McCarthy 
stated that he felt that having the body shop was extremely con­
venient, and that it provided a substantial, if somewhat intangible, 
contribution to the operation of the agency through (1) a general 
increase in customer goodwill, and (2) the sale of body repair parts. 
Stanley pointed out that these two advantages were true for all new 
car dealerships, but that in spite of these advantages, most of the 
other dealers in Ralston had their body work done by one or more 
of the local independents. He stated that in his experience this was a 
highly specialized business which was difficult to operate efficiently 
“with your left hand.”
Halliday also pointed out that there were some additional benefits 
received by McCarthy-Halliday, Inc., as a result of operating its own 
body shop. First, he said, it was his feeling that the dealership 
obtained service work and also new and used car sales as a result of 
its having its own body shop. The service work would come when 
motorists who had brought their cars to the body shop had been 
sufficiently pleased with the work done for them to decide to have 
all their future repair and service work done by McCarthy-Halliday. 
New and used car sales resulted from occasions when a badly wrecked 
car was brought to the body shop, and either Mr. McCarthy or Mr. 
Halliday was able to persuade the owner of the wreck that he would 
be far better advised to purchase a new or used car than to spend 
large amounts of money repairing his wrecked car. In such a case 
it was also extremely likely that the individual, if he took this advice,
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would then continue to return to the dealership for repair and service 
work as needed. Unfortunately, Mr. Halliday said that he had no 
idea of the actual dollar volume of service work brought in through 
this channel. It was just his impression that some work had definitely 
come from this source.   Mr. McCarthy agreed with what Mr. Halliday 
had said, and told Mr. Stanley that it was his feeling that possibly 
one or two new or used car sales per year resulted from the chain 
of events that Mr. Halliday had just described.2 Mr. McCarthy said 
that he could not specifically remember any recent sales of this type, 
but that he was quite certain that there had been occasional instances 
where this had happened. The three men agreed that these factors 
were so difficult to pinpoint in dollars that they would be excluded 
from the financial analysis that Stanley would make, and would simply 
be included as intangibles when they came to make their final decision.
At this point Stanley felt that he was ready to make his analysis 
and suggested to McCarthy and Halliday that they meet again at 
lunch the following day to review his progress. He said that he might 
possibly have some questions as he went along from step to step, 
and would check with them if he did.
Questions
1. Prepare an analysis of the effect of closing the body shop on 
the dealership’s financial results for 1962, 1963, and 1964 to date, 
assuming that the closing took place prior to 1962.
2. What additional information, if any, do you require to com­
plete your analysis?
3. Should the body shop be closed? How would you weigh the 
effect of the intangible factors mentioned by Messrs. McCarthy and 
Halliday?
Commentary on McCarthy-Halliday, Inc.
Mr. Stanley’s Analysis
Stanley’s initial feeling was that computing the financial effect of 
closing the body shop (i.e., the loss that could have been avoided 
since 1962 had the body shop not existed) was a relatively simple
2 The dealership sold approximately three hundred cars per year, in total.
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matter of identifying the variable items in the body shop’s income 
statement and determining whether their net total resulted in either 
a profit or loss. By “variable” items he meant those items of income 
or expense that were directly concerned with and attributable to the 
body shop’s existence and operations. If these variable items showed 
an excess of income over expense, the body shop would be contributing 
to the dealership’s overall profits, and the dealership would be worse 
off financially without it. If expenses exceeded income, it would add 
to the dealership’s profits to close the body shop.
In studying the dealership’s departmental income statement and 
gross profit analysis, however, Stanley identified two points which 
would vitally affect the results of his analysis. These were:
1. The contribution to profits provided by body shop labor on in­
ternal work
2. The contribution to profits generated by parts sales to the body 
shop.
With respect to both of these items the dealership’s income state­
ment showed gross profits being made, the former being included in 
the body shop’s statement and the latter in the parts department’s. 
Stanley decided to review each of these problems in turn.
Internal Body Shop Labor
As a result of similar analyses that he had prepared in the past for 
other dealership clients, Mr. Stanley was well aware of the analytical 
problems posed in trying to quantify the profits attributable to in­
ternal body work. The problem was not simply one of ignoring the 
profits reported for internal work on the grounds that they were fic­
titious because of the intra-company aspect of the transactions. It 
was a fact that the body shop did perform services for the used car 
department and that these services were valuable in that they in­
creased the resale value of the cars that were repaired. Part of this 
increase was in effect passed on to the body shop through the medium 
of its charges to the used car department.
One approach that Mr. Stanley had used successfully on previous 
occasions was to measure and compare the out-of-pocket costs of (1) 
providing the necessary services with a “captive” (internal) body 
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shop, and (2) purchasing the services from an independent shop. The 
reasoning here was that if the used car department were able to 
obtain body shop services from other body shops at no more than the 
actual out-of-pocket direct cost of internal work to the dealership as 
a whole, then there was no particular advantage to the dealership, as 
far as internal work was concerned, in having the body shop at all. 
Thus the existence of the body shop for internal work could only be 
justified if it provided services at a lower direct cost than would be 
incurred if these services were obtained outside the dealership. The 
fixed costs of the body shop could be ignored at this stage of the 
analysis and considered later in a final summary of the profitability 
of the shop as a whole.
Stanley knew that body shop work could be “purchased” from any 
of the other body shops in the area for the standard trade price of 
retail less 20 per cent. He also knew that there were five other body 
shops in the Ralston area that were already doing a substantial 
volume of work for the other automobile dealerships in the area, be­
cause most dealerships did not have their own body shops. He felt 
safe in assuming that any of them would be able to provide what­
ever services McCarthy-Halliday needed.
Stanley summarized (from Exhibit 3) the data concerning billings 
for internal body shop labor for 1962, 1963, and the seven months of 
1964, and then adjusted it for internal and trade billing discounts 
as shown in Table 1:
7 Months
1964
Internal billings for body shop labor ......... $4,441
Adjust to bring to retail value of billings
(11% mark-up) ..........................................  489
Retail value of body shop labor ................. $4,930
Trade discount from retail for body work
done by independents (20%) ................. 986
Net purchase cost of external body work . .. $3,944
Cost of direct labor for internal body work
(Exhibit 3) ................................................  1,664
Increased cost of purchased body w o rk ..... $2,280
Table 1
1963 1962
$5,972 $2,988
657 329
$6,629 $3,317
1,326 663
$5,303 $2,654
2,510 1,316
$2,793 $1,338
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The figures in Table 1 required a further adjustment, Mr. Stanley 
knew, to reflect competitive bidding and the fixed price nature of 
services purchased from independents. When a dealership used out­
side contractors, the normal practice was for the body shop concerned 
to submit a written estimate of the work that was to be done, as in 
the case when an ordinary motorist brought in an automobile for 
body work. Such an estimate amounted to a guaranteed price for the 
work, because it amounted to an offer by the body shop to do the 
work at that price. On the other hand, McCarthy-Halliday had not 
followed the practice of having estimates made up for internal work. 
The owners had not seen the necessity for such formality. They knew, 
however, that the result of this procedure was that there was poor 
internal control over the amount of time that the body shop used 
and charged for internal work. Because of the small size of their body 
shop, the owners preferred to use direct supervision to control the 
efficiency of the work force.
Discussing this matter with the owners, Stanley showed them the 
data in Table 1, pointing out that the internal labor cost was a direct 
cost only and that fringe benefits would be picked up in a subse­
quent part of his analysis. The question he posed for the owners was 
“Recognizing that competition among the independents sometimes 
results in aggressive bidding for business, and that the retail value of 
internal work shown here reflects no competitive factors at all, what 
do you think the real increased cost of purchased body work will be?” 
After a fairly lively discussion of this question, the owners finally de­
cided that Mr. Stanley should use a further adjustment of 15 per cent 
of the retail value to reflect the combined effects of competitive bid­
ding. As Mr. Stanley pointed out, “We re just trying to quantify things 
as best we can at this point, and you’ll have a chance to review the 
whole picture in a better perspective when the analysis is completed.” 
He then prepared Table 2 to reflect the agreed-upon adjustment:
7 Months 
1964 1963
Table 2
1962
Retail value of labor (Table 1) ............... $4,930 $6,629 $3,317
15% adjustment for competitive bidding 
Increased cost computed in Table 1 .....
$(740)
2,280
$(994)
2,793
$(498)
1,338
Net increase in cost of outside w o rk ....... $1,540 $1,799 $ 840
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Parts Sales to the Body Shop
Turning to the second major problem, Stanley knew that parts 
sales to the body shop were about $1,000 per month, or about 25 per 
cent of total parts department internal sales (“Repair Orders” on 
the Gross Profit Statement; the remaining 75 per cent went to service 
and engine repair jobs). Based on a spot check of some items, and 
his own knowledge of trade practices, he felt it safe to assume that 
the gross margin on body shop parts was no different from the average 
gross margin realized on all Repair Order parts. This he calculated 
at about 36 per cent for the period since January 1, 1962 (35.6 per 
cent in 1962, 35.2 per cent in 1963 and 36.8 per cent for 1964 through 
July). Thus approximately $4,000 per year gross margin was at stake 
on these sales. There would, of course, be no guarantee that any of 
these sales would be maintained if the body shop were closed, 
although Stanley felt that at a minimum some would be. He decided 
to check his feelings on this with the two partners.
Evan McCarthy gave him quite an emphatic opinion on the 
question. He pointed out that McCarthy-Halliday was the only dealer 
of this “make” in Ralston. It was, therefore, also the only local source 
of genuine factory parts. He pointed out that even at present, several 
of the independent body shops purchased parts from McCarthy- 
Halliday when they had their make of car in for repair and needed 
or wanted the correct replacement parts. Mr. McCarthy said that he 
saw no reason at all why it would not be possible for him to arrange 
with all the independent body shops that in exchange for referring 
body shop work to them, they would undertake to purchase all their 
“make” parts requirements from McCarthy-Halliday. If this could be 
done, and Mr. McCarthy said that he saw no reason at all why it could 
not be done, then he did not feel that any parts sales would be lost at 
all if the body shop were closed down. All that would simply happen 
would be that the sales would be made to the independent body shops 
who were doing repair work on their “make” cars, rather than to or 
through the dealership’s own body shop. He acknowledged that it was 
possible that some sales would be irretrievably lost, but he did not feel 
that the amount would be significant.
Mr. Stanley pointed out that, based on his experience, the loss of 
sales might be important enough to try to quantify it, primarily 
because independent body shops typically made greater use of used 
parts (cannibalized from wrecks) in order to permit them to quote 
lower estimates on repair jobs. Both the owners agreed with this ob-
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servation, and after some discussion it was agreed that the sales of 
body parts would probably decrease about 25 per cent if the internal 
body shop were closed. Following this discussion, Mr. Stanley then 
prepared Table 3 to calculate the profit effect of both the reduced 
sales volume and the trade discounts given to purchasers by independ­
ent body shops:
1.
2,
3.
4.
5.
6.
Parts department billings on
Repair Orders (Exhibit 3) ........................
Estimated 25% billed to internal
body shop .................................................
Gross margin on body shop parts
(36% of line 2) .......................................
Estimated retail value of sales to 
independents if body shop is 
closed (75% of line 2) ............................
Gross margin to McCarthy-Halliday if billed 
at 20% off retail (16% of line 4) .........
Loss in profit on parts sales
(line 3 minus line 5) ..............................
7 Months 
1964
$27,509
$ 6,877
$ 2,476
$ 5,158
$ 825
$ 1,651
1963
$48,853
$12,213
$ 4,397
$ 9,160
$ 1,466
$ 2,931
Table 3
1962
$47,895
$11,996
$ 4,319
$ 8,997
$ 1,440
$ 2,879
Stanley’s Summarization
Mr. Stanley felt that he now had sufficient information to arrive at 
an estimate of the effect on profits of closing the body shop. His 
calculations are reproduced in Exhibit 4, page 69.
By totaling the expenses that could not be eliminated, and subtract­
ing them from the total expenses charge to the body shop, Mr. Stanley 
arrived at a net total body shop expense which he estimated could 
actually be eliminated if the body shop itself were eliminated. By 
deducting the gross profit from external sales, shown on the first line 
of his analysis, from the net total of expenses that could be eliminated, 
Mr. Stanley arrived at an amount that he described as the “gain that 
would have resulted from closing the body shop.” This he then 
adjusted for the two less precise factors discussed above: the cost 
savings on internal body work and the profits on body parts sold.
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Exhibit 4
McCARTHY-HALLIDAY, INC.
Analysis of Body Shop Financial Results for 
the Seven Months Ended July 31, 1964
and the Years Ended December 31, 1963-62
Seven Months Ended Years Ended December 31
July 31, 1964
Gross profit, labor sales 
(customers) ....................
Total expenses charged to
body shop ......................  $14,580
Less: Expenses that could 
not be eliminated by dis­
continuing the body shop
1963
8,561 $18,147 $17,439
Salaries—owners .......  $ 980
Salaries—clerical .......  1,233
Advertising ................  36
Contributions..............  16
Legal and audit .......  91
Insurance ....................  145
T otal........................  $ 2,501
$26,150 $25,256
$ 1,800 $ 2,400
2,021 1,704
138 350
34 30
156 156
100 303
$ 4,249 $ 4,943
Total expenses that could 
be eliminated ................
Direct gain that would have 
resulted from closing the 
body shop ......................
Less: Extra cost if internal 
body work is purchased
outside (Table 2) .......  $ 1,540
Profits lost on sales of
body parts (Table 3) 1,651
Total adjustments ..
Estimated net gain or 
(loss) in dealership 
profits if body shop 
is closed ........................
$12,079 $21,901
$ 3,518
$ 1,799
$ 3,754
J$ 840
3,191
2,931
4,730
2,879
$ 327 $ (976)
$20,313
$ 2,874
3,719
$ (845)
Once Exhibit 4 was completed, Mr. Stanley then met again with 
the owners to review his analysis. During this discussion, Stanley 
re-emphasized three points:
1. Closing the body shop was feasible because of its separate 
location and the availability of several qualified independent shops in 
the area.
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2. There would be a direct gain from closing the shop ($3,518 thus 
far in 1964) because the expenses that could be saved exceeded the 
revenue from external sales of body shop labor.
3. The body shop offered advantages to both the used car depart­
ment and parts department of the dealership. A rough attempt to 
quantify these advantages indicated that they approximately offset the 
“direct” loss on the body shop.
“You know as well as I,” Mr. Stanley continued, “how rough these 
latter estimates are; about all you can do is use your judgment from 
this point on. The question probably boils down to the one you 
started with concerning the best use of your time. You’re not getting 
any direct return on whatever time you now devote to body shop 
activities, but on the other hand you are able to offer a more complete 
service to your customers at essentially no cost other than the value 
of your time. What this means in terms of selling new and used cars 
and in attracting business for the service department generally is a 
basic point to consider.”
Stanley asked whether either of the two men had any additional 
questions. They both replied in the negative, and assured him that 
they would think very carefully about the analysis that he had made 
and the discussion which the three of them had just concluded. They 
were still not certain whether they ought to close the body shop, but 
they admitted that Stanley had certainly defined the alternatives 
more clearly for them.
After he had returned to the office, Mr. Stanley dictated a short 
memorandum to Mr. Gifford summarizing his day’s activities at 
McCarthy-Halliday, and concluding: “In short, I think that my analysis 
covered a useful point for Evan and Vic and that they were glad that 
it was done.”
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Jaguar Castings, Inc., was a small manufacturer of precision castings 
in Anaheim, California. The president, and sole owner of the common 
stock, was Peter R. Williams, a graduate of the California Institute 
of Technology. Williams and his older brother, Hugh, had started 
the company in 1955, when Peter Williams graduated with a master 
of science degree in metallurgy. Hugh Williams had been in the 
purchasing department of a major electronics manufacturer in Los 
Angeles, and believed that a profitable market existed for high qual­
ity nonferrous metal castings among the mushrooming electronics 
companies in the area. With Peter Williams’ technical skill and Hugh 
Williams’ industry experience and contacts the new company soon 
established a niche for itself in its field, emphasizing precision and 
the highest quality as the hallmarks of its work. In early 1959 Hugh 
Williams was offered the post of Vice President-Purchasing in the 
company he had left to establish Jaguar Castings. Since Jaguar Cast­
ings, Inc., was now well-established, and since Peter Williams was 
confident of his ability to maintain the momentum of the early years’ 
growth, Hugh resigned to take the post, and sold his stock back to 
the company (his employer prohibited officers investing in actual or 
potential suppliers).
From 1959 to 1965 Jaguar Castings had been subjected to a history 
of frequent ups and downs, culminating in severe losses and a drastic 
curtailment of volume. In May 1965 Peter Williams telephoned 
Thomas D. Thomson, a partner in the CPA firm of Gardner, Steph­
enson, White and Co. (Jaguar Castings’ auditors), explaining that he 
had a problem: In his view only a major expansion program would 
enable the company to survive, and asked for Thomson’s help in an­
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alyzing the proposed program’s profitability. Williams explained that 
one of the reasons for his call was that the prospective source of 
new capital for the expansion had requested a third party’s reaction 
and an indication as to the probable financial outcome.
Gardner, Stephenson, White and Co.
Gardner, Stephenson, White and Co. was a medium-sized CPA 
firm, with headquarters in Los Angeles and smaller offices in San 
Diego and San Francisco. The firm had come into being as a result 
of a series of mergers of smaller firms, primarily because of a desire 
on the part of the principals involved to expand the scope of their 
activities beyond auditing and tax work into management services. 
It was felt that a larger firm could pool resources and would be in 
a better position to establish and support a comprehensive manage­
ment services group. This theory had worked well in practice. In 
1965 the management services group was headed by a partner, and 
included three senior associates and six staff men. In total, Gardner, 
Stephenson, White and Co. had twelve partners and a total profes­
sional staff of 126. The bulk of the staff, including the management 
services group, was located in the Los Angeles office, where the firm 
occupied a floor in the recently completed Pacific Petroleum building.
Thomas D. Thomson was the partner in charge of the Jaguar Cast­
ings, Inc., audit. Jaguar had become a Gardner, Stephenson, White 
and Co. client soon after its formation, when the company had first 
approached its bankers, the Anaheim National Bank, for a term loan. 
One of the conditions imposed by the bank was the regular submission 
of audited financial statements. Over the years a very cordial rela­
tionship had built up between Peter Williams and Thomson, with 
Thomson often giving Williams informal advice on business problems. 
Thomson felt that this was part of the service he ought to give his 
clients, but he had also told Williams about the firm’s management 
services activities and had offered to have them work on any major 
project if Williams ever required such assistance. When he telephoned 
Thomson on this occasion, Williams started out by saying that he 
thought that the time had finally come when he could use some help 
from the firm’s management services group. After a brief discussion 
Thomson arranged an appointment for Williams for the following 
morning to meet with Terence E. Dunn, the partner in charge of the 
management services group.
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Meeting with Williams
Present at the meeting with Williams were Thomson, Dunn, and 
Henry G. Benson, one of Dunn’s three senior associates, who was to 
take charge of the assignment. Before the meeting, the three CPAs 
had each reviewed Jaguar Castings’ financial statements for the past 
five years. The Comparative Balance sheets at April 30, 1961 to 1965 
are shown in Exhibit 1, pages 74 and 75, Comparative Statements of 
Income for the five years ended on those dates in Exhibit 2, page 76, 
and the Comparative Statements of Cost of Goods Manufactured and 
Sold in Exhibit 3, pages 77 and 78.
Thomson suggested to Williams that he first review Jaguar Castings’ 
history before describing the project he had in mind. After briefly 
describing how the company had started, and how he ended up with 
sole control in 1959 after his brother had resigned, Williams continued:
“After Hugh left I buckled down to do some selling, too, in addition 
to watching over the production and administrative side as I had 
been doing since we started. In the 1960 and 1961 fiscal years1 our 
sales went right on growing. The electronics industry was in a boom 
period, then, and as you probably know almost all our work was 
done for electronics companies. The best of the boom came in our 
1962 fiscal year. Sales increased almost 20 per cent over 1961, aided 
partly by the fact that we were getting into a program of selling 
through independent sales representatives who acted as middlemen 
between small parts manufacturers and fabricators such as ourselves, 
and the ever-increasing number of electronics firms of all sizes. I had 
found that I could handle the sales side reasonably well, but when 
volume began to pick up I needed to spend more of my time in the 
shop. Besides, there was no question that sales representatives were 
better qualified than I to sell, and also their handling a full lin e  helped 
get them an entree into companies where either I had no contact 
and would have had to spend a lot of time getting them interested, 
or where the potential sales of our products were simply too small 
to justify a sales call by anyone representing us solely. It seemed to 
make a lot of sense, from both the sellers’ and the buyers’ points of 
view, to transact business through this kind of middleman, and this 
trend developed rapidly. Of course, we did not need outside help in 
servicing our major customers; I continued to handle this through
1 Jaguar Castings’ fiscal year ended on April 30.
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Exhibit 2
JAGUAR CASTINGS, INC. 
Comparative Statement of Income 
For the Years Ended April 30, 1961-1965
April 30,
1965 1964 1963 1962 1961
Sales: Nonferrous $393,804 $435,988 $430,740 $540,510 $456,355
Ferrous 3,159 59,266 6,902 — —
Gross sales $396,963 $495,254 $437,642 $540,510 $456,355
Less returns and discounts $ 5,648 $ 57,638 $ 1,844 $ 2,152 $ 1,935
Net sales $391,315 $437,616 $435,798 $538,358 $454,420
Less—cost of goods manufactured
and sold (Exhibit 3) $309,106 $383,426 $401,222 $431,252 $383,302
Gross profit on sales $ 82,209 $ 54,190 $ 34,576 $107,106 $ 71,118
General and administrative expenses
Officer’s salary $ 12,006 $ 12,082 $ 12,052 $ 15,000 $ 15,000
Office salaries 11,145 11,742 11,559 11,417 10,460
Sales, salaries, commissions 19,026 18,040 25,427 5,932 537
Group insurance 4,006 3,642 10,247 7,293 7,642
Telephone 4,408 5,036 5,090 3,571 2,988
Interest 11,029 12,655 6,328 2,249 2,105
Payroll taxes 13,492 9,280 13,259 11,404 9,208
Auto expense 2,420 2,414 2,561 2,598 2,311
Building maintenance 3,582 2,383 2,136 1,140 1,858
Legal and audit fees 1,223 5,015 4,703 3,625 4,626
Depreciation 2,722 2,722 3,290 2,620 2,206
Travel and entertainment 567 1,132 2,697 3,665 3,551
Office expense 1,151 1,930 2,601 1,410 2,649
Advertising 272 797 3,229 1,930 644
Taxes—general 2,299 2,038 2,485 3,987 1,989
Miscellaneous 2,561 2,752 2,921 5,207 2,488
Total general and administrative
expense $ 91,909 $ 93,660 $110,585 $ 83,048 $ 70,262
Gain (loss) from operations $ (9,700) $(39,470) $(76,009) $ 24,058 $ 856
Sale of scrap 5,987 3,863 1,533 — —
Gain (loss) for year $ (3,713) $(35,607) $(74,476) $ 24,058 $ 856
Federal income tax — — (14,841) 10,731 455
Net gain (loss) after taxes $ (3,713) $(35,607) $(59,635) $ 13,327 $ 401
Retained earnings (deficit),
Beginning of year $(38,294)$ (2 ,687)$  56,948 $ 43,621 $ 43,220
Retained earnings (deficit),
End of year $(42,007) $(38,294) $ (2,687) $ 56,948 $ 43,621
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Exhibit 3
JAGUAR CASTINGS, INC.
Cost of Goods Manufactured and Sold
For The Years Ended April 30, 1961-1965
April 30,
1965 1964 1963 1962 1961
Inventory, beginning of year $ 42,828 $ 49,587 $ 42,155 $ 39,346 $ 38,880
Materials purchased 85,757 114,142 147,893 146,218 134,656
Freight in 6,398 6,488 5,940 7,244 6,914
Total $134,983 $170,217 $195,988 $192,808 $180,450
Inventory, end of year 43,529 42,828 49,587 42,155 39,346
Materials consumed $ 91,454 $127,389 $146,401 $150,653 $141,104
Direct labor $123,345 $151,680 $145,090 $159,254 $140,464
Total direct cost $214,799 $279,069 $291,491 $309,907 $281,568
Factory overhead
Foremen’s salaries $ 21,058 $ 19,684 $ 20,180 $ 18,427 $ 15,607
Technical salaries 12,267 13,608 18,503 17,725 12,480
Insurance 7,216 7,853 7,527 7,311 6,726
Factory supples and tools 15,908 19,117 25,959 38,329 36,492
Utilities 17,835 18,659 16,674 18,018 17,057
Depreciation 13,485 13,475 11,075 10,520 8,825
Building maintenance and expense 3,731 5,440 6,640 6,560 3,132
Finishing expenses 2,807 6,521 3,173 4,455 1,415
Total factory overhead $ 94,307 $104,357 $109,731 $121,345 $101,734
Total cost of goods manufactured
and sold $309,106 $383,426 $401,222 $431,252 $383,302
JAGUAR CASTINGS, INC.
Balance Sheet Ratios
Current ratio
Quick ratio
1965
.90
.50
April 30, 1961 through 1965
1964
.95
.55
1963
.65
.37
1962
1.34
.82
1961
1.21
.62
Total assets/total liabilities .92 .94 1.08 1.69 1.64
Total assets ($000) 223 242 281 195 170
Current assets (%  ) 49.7 46.7 49.3 59.3 51.4
Fixed assets (%  ) 44.0 46.9 45.9 31.2 34.3
Other assets (%  ) 6.3 6.4 4.8 9.5 14.3
Total assets (%  ) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Current liabilities ( % ) 55.1 49.4 75.9 44.2 42.5
Long-term liab. (%  ) 53.4 56.9 16.8 14.9 18.3
Equity (% ) (8.5) (6.3) 7.3 40.9 39.2
Total liab. & equity (%  ) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Cost of Goods Manufactured and Sold
Expressed in Percentage
1965
For the Years Ended 
April 30, 1961 through 1965
19611964 1963 1962
Materials consumed 29.6   33.2 36.5 35.0 36.8
Direct labor 39.9 39.6 36.5 36.9 36.6
Total direct cost 69.5 72.8 73.0 71.9 73.4
Factory overhead 30.5 27.2 27.0 28.1 26.6
Total cost of goods
manufactured and sold 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Direct materials
As % of net sales 23.4 29.1 33.6 28.0 31.0
Direct labor
As % of net sales 31.5   34.7 33.3 29.6 30.1
JAGUAR CASTINGS, INC. 
Statement of Income 
Expressed in Percentage
1965
For the Years Ended
April 30, 1961 through 1965
19611964 1963 1962
Gross sales 101.4 113.2 100.4 100.4 100.4
Less returns and discounts — 1.4 — 13.2 — .4 —.4 —.4
Net sales 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Less cost of goods manufactured 
and sold —79.00 —87.6 —92.1 --80.1 —84.4
Gross profit 21.0 12.4 7.9 19.9 15.6
Less G & A expense —23.5 —21.4 —25.4 --15.4 —15.4
Gain/ ( loss) from operations (2.5) (9.0) (17.5) 4.5 .2
Sale of scrap 1.5 .9 .4 — —
Gain/ ( loss) for year (1.0) (8.1) (17.1) 4.5 .2
Fed income tax — — 3.4 —2.0 .1
Net gain/(loss) after tax (1.0) (8.1) (13.7) 2.5 .1
1962, and in 1963 when, as I will bring out in a minute, I was very 
much occupied with the shop, we hired a young sales representative 
exclusively to service them. He had a good engineering background 
and worked closely with our customers’ design and engineering groups, 
and with our shop, as a sort of liason. We found this worked well, 
and kept our major customers very happy, and this relationship proved 
invaluable when the big bust came. But I’m getting ahead of myself.
“Up to 1962 all of our work was in precision casting of nonferrous 
metals, such as aluminum, brass and copper. This was because, first, 
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we had identified this as a profitable market when we started (and it 
was), and, second, because the manufacturing processes are much 
more complex for ferrous metals (iron and steel). The primary reason 
for this is the much higher temperatures required, in the 3,000-4,000 
degree range, compared to 1,200-1,500 for nonferrous metals. How­
ever, as we got into the 1963 fiscal year several things happened which 
made me decide to expand into ferrous metals casting.
“The most important reason was the fact that it seemed as though 
the electronics business was beginning to take a bit of a beating. Our 
sales of nonferrous metals dropped off significantly below the all-time 
high of 1962. Prices were being shaved, too, as we and our competitors 
scrambled for what had suddenly become a declining market. How­
ever, we were still all geared up to go at the 1962 level, and thought 
we’d like to maintain that level of operations if we possibly could, 
rather than cut back.
“On closer examination this expansion seemed to make all sorts of 
long-run sense, too. I had always known that nonferrous metals were 
a much smaller market than ferrous metals, but until I investigated 
I didn’t realize that ferrous metal castings accounted for 90 per cent 
of the total precision castings market. Once I had established this, 
it made a lot of sense for us to try to enter this market, because on the 
surface, at any rate, it offered a much greater scope for future growth. 
With nonferrous castings only we were limiting ourselves to only 
10 per cent of the total potential in precision castings.
“The clincher came when we started getting feedback from our 
sales representatives to the effect that our reputation, in our field, 
plus the needs and demands of their customers, constituted a clear 
opportunity for us in ferrous metals. They needed a ferrous metals 
capability to round out their offerings; they would often sell precision 
ferrous castings on the same sales call with quite unrelated items or 
even with nonferrous castings. In short, they asked us to see if we 
could go into this field. They also felt that having ferrous metals 
capability would even increase sales of nonferrous castings to some 
extent, because if they sold our ferrous line to a new customer who 
had small requirements in nonferrous castings as well, he would 
probably channel those orders to us.
“Of course, this decision involved some investment. Once we had 
decided to go ahead, additional facilities and equipment were needed. 
Initially we financed this expansion primarily on a short-term basis, 
assuming that our total cash flow, as increased by the hoped-for profits
79
from the ferrous castings programs, would support our short-term 
obligations. We did raise some long-term capital, however, by re­
writing our mortgage to cover our expanded facilities.
“As the 1963 fiscal year drew to a close, several factors became very 
apparent. We had underestimated the start-up time, and hence the 
start-up cost, of the new facilities. In large part this was the result 
of higher temperature requirements, which proved costly to master 
since nothing was accomplished either by ‘experimentation’ (during 
working hours) or by attempting and sometimes failing to complete 
customer orders for ferrous work.
“Sales of ferrous casting work were also slower than we had antici­
pated. However, there was no delay in the upward movement of all 
the operating cost categories that responded to the increased capacity 
we were putting in—and that was just about everything. In effect, 
therefore, we established new capacity (ferrous) while still maintain­
ing the capability scale for regular operations (nonferrous) at the level 
it had reached the previous year—a year which turned out in retro­
spect to be the peak of the electronics industry’s growth.
“1963 turned out to have been a pretty grim year when the figures 
were finally put together. With revenue down, costs up, and start-up 
costs also to be written off, we had an operating loss of $76,000 for 
the year.
“Nonferrous sales declined still further in our 1964 fiscal year, but 
ferrous sales seemed to be building up nicely, more than making up 
the difference—until our ferrous stuff started coming back, with some 
bitter complaints, from customers who claimed that our ferrous work 
was substandard. Unfortunately this was true. Even more unfortu­
nate, customers began finding or sometimes just mentally creating de­
fects in our nonferrous work, and started sending that back too— 
often at the same time, implying that on the basis of the quality of 
our ferrous work (or lack of it) they weren’t prepared to take any 
risks with the nonferrous, in case the quality there had suffered too.
“In 1964 we did make some progress. We arranged a loan from the 
Small Business Administration and set up a favorable factoring ar­
rangement with the Anaheim National Bank. These actions enabled 
us to realign our debt structure and thereby removed the threat of 
not being able to meet our short-term liabilities incurred in 1963 which 
we could not hope to cover when due. We also made some progress 
in cutting back our overhead, but still ended the year with a sizeable 
loss—caused mainly, I believe, by the very high rate of returns. How­
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ever, 1964’s loss was sufficient, from a balance sheet point of view, to 
completely wipe out our equity.
“Looking back, I think the only thing that kept us alive after our 
1964 results came out, and our major creditors received our balance 
sheet, was the fact that if we did liquidate our creditors would have 
had pretty slim pickings, and sorting out the tangled mess of whose 
security covered how much, and so on, would have been a Herculean 
task and in the end a wasted effort, because there would have been 
so little to go round. So they let us continue, in the hope that we 
could eventually work our way out.
“1965, the fiscal year that ended last month, was another very dif­
ficult year. The shakeout in the electronics business continued, further 
weakening our main base of operations, nonferrous sales. Sales last 
year were approximately three-quarters of the peak reached in 1962— 
and in view of conditions in the industry that’s pretty good going. 
We did have some ferrous sales last year, toward the beginning of 
the year, as we completed orders written in 1964, but we stopped 
pushing this side of the business because it seemed fairly obvious that 
the ferrous castings experiment had been both costly and extremely 
unprofitable. We had to do some cutting back, and this was a good 
place to start, while we were licking our wounds and catching our 
breath. As soon as the last order for ferrous castings was completed 
we mothballed the special ferrous casting equipment, and concen­
trated on trying to keep Jaguar in existence. I didn’t want to sell the 
equipment in a hurry, because I thought it was worth far more, in 
place, for us than it would have been in the second-hand machinery 
market. Besides, although we were strapped we weren’t penniless. 
The cash would have been nice to have but we didn’t need it to 
survive. It’s still sitting there, idle and under wraps, in the addition 
we built in 1963, which is more-or-less closed off for the time being.
“We did lose money in 1965, but we came mighty close to breaking 
even, and in fact I think that for the last six months of the fiscal year 
we were breaking even, or possibly doing marginally better. So I 
think we’ve got the situation under control now. The tide of losses 
has been stopped. However, our business is by no means in perfect 
health. That’s what has concerned m e for the past m onth or two. I 
think I’ve come u p  with a solution, in fact a rather surprising solution. 
And this is where I need your help, because I need someone to check 
out my intuitive feel for the situation by looking at hard facts, which 
you gentlemen are far better qualified to do than I.
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“As I see it, something has to be done. Merely holding things at 
breakeven level is no solution, although having got there is certainly 
progress, bearing in mind what happened in 1963 and 1964. Some­
thing has to be done about paying off our debts, and the only reason 
we haven’t  been thrown into bankruptcy is that I’ve persuaded our 
creditors that their best solution is to let us try to restore the company 
to profitable operations. So the problem is: How?
“Thinking it all over, it seems to me that the decline of the elec­
tronics industry will continue. By decline I really mean that the years 
of explosive growth are gone; the industry is maturing, settling down 
to a highly competitive level, and is not going to offer the possibilities 
of volume growth that we would need to make the nonferrous side of 
the business sufficiently profitable (or profitable at all). And the elec­
tronics industry is the major user of precision nonferrous castings in 
this area, so there’s nowhere else to look for new sources of sales of 
this line.
“On the other hand, the ferrous metals side is as big as ever. Also, 
it’s a much more stable market, since most of the demand is from con­
sumer goods manufacturers. Consumer products markets are much less 
subject to economic fluctuations than industrial and capital goods; also 
the electronics industry is affected not only by rapid changes in the 
state of the art but also, and equally important, by unpredictable 
changes in government procurement policies and programs. Our prob­
lem the last time around was that we, or rather I, rushed into ferrous 
metals with an excess of optimism and a minimum of knowledge. I 
assumed that our expertise in nonferrous metals would pull us through, 
but it simply wasn’t enough. The potential in ferrous metals is still 
there, nine or ten times as much as nonferrous metals. I want to get 
back in, only this time I’m going to do it a little more carefully, and 
try to learn from our mistakes last time.
“As you know, the Navy has announced the partial closing of the 
Naval Ordnance Depot at San Diego, in line with the streamlining 
program being applied to all defense facilities. Through my friends 
in the field I’ve made contact with a metallurgist down there who has 
specialized in ferrous metals casting. He’s a civilian employee, not 
a career Navy man, and they’ve offered him a transfer to Portsmouth, 
New Hampshire, but he wants to stay where it’s warm. He was getting 
ready to start looking for a job when I came along. We’ve discussed 
Jaguar’s situation, and we both feel that his background and technical 
knowledge could be the “missing link” that would enable Jaguar to
82
JAGUAR CASTINGS, INC.
get started back into ferrous castings on a proper footing. More to the 
point, he has a little capital of his own, and as part of the deal he’s 
offered to invest $25,000 for a one-third interest in the company, with 
an option at the same price for sufficient additional stock to bring 
him up to 50 per cent. Since I’m fairly well convinced that getting 
into ferrous metals is the thing for us to do, and since Jaguar Castings 
stock is hardly worth the paper it’s printed on, right now, giving up 
a piece of the equity seems a reasonable thing to do if it will give us 
a chance to make the equity worth anything at all. After all, half of 
something is better than all of nothing.
“The man’s name is James A. Hunt. He feels, and I can hardly 
blame him, that it would be well worth the effort and cost to try to find 
out now, before he joins us, whether there’s any possibility of the 
company returning to profitability. So that’s why I’m here. I’ll give 
you all the time, information and help that I can. If you’re willing 
to take the assignment, the sooner we get started the better.”
By the time that Williams had reached the end of his description 
of Jaguar Castings’ history and problems it was almost noon, and the 
four men went off to lunch together. Over lunch Dunn and Benson 
asked Williams to elucidate on some of the points he had mentioned, 
and also asked some additional questions. After lunch they returned 
to the office, and Dunn told Williams that the firm would be glad to 
accept the assignment of investigating the possible profitability of the 
proposed expansion program into precision ferrous castings. This 
would not be a market survey, but would include an examination of 
all relevant financial considerations, and the preparation of a series 
of financial projections. The project would probably require two man- 
weeks of time, and would be undertaken by Henry Benson, under the 
joint supervision of both Thomson and Dunn. Work could begin 
within a week. The firm’s fee and billing arrangements were dis­
cussed, and Williams found them quite acceptable. He accepted the 
proposal on the spot and asked that Benson begin work as soon as 
possible.
Questions
1. How should Benson proceed with this assignment?
2. What information is required to answer Williams’ question? 
How can it be obtained?,
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3. What would be the most useful format for presentation of the 
results of the investigation?
Commentary on Jaguar Castings, Inc.
Three days after the meeting at which Peter Williams described 
the investigation he wanted made, Henry Benson, senior management 
services associate on the staff of Gardner, Stephenson, White and Co., 
arrived at the company’s office to begin work on the project.
Benson felt that there were four critical areas for investigation:
1. Investment, if any, to get back into the production of ferrous 
castings
2. Production costs for ferrous castings
3. Sales forecasts
4. Working capital requirements to support the expansion program
Benson decided to review each of these areas in turn.
1. Investment. Soon after he arrived at the plant, Benson was given 
a tour through the manufacturing facilities. He observed that one 
section of the plant was barricaded off and out of use. This was the 
area that had been added in 1963 when the first ferrous metals pro­
gram had been started. Benson’s guide took him into this area and 
showed him various pieces of machinery and equipment that were 
set in place on the plant floor, but that were either heavily greased, or 
shrouded in heavy plastic covers. Benson discussed the question of 
investment needs with Williams, and Williams assured him that the 
ferrous casting section could be opened up and made ready for pro­
duction with only a nominal amount of investment. Williams said 
that obviously everything would have to be cleaned up, tested and, 
where appropriate, adjusted. A large part of the clean-up work could 
be done by Jaguar’s own labor force, at no incremental cost except for 
cleaning materials. Williams indicated that he would have the service 
departments of the various manufacturers of the equipment send teams 
out to the Jaguar plant to do the testing and adjusting; all this work 
would be on a parts-and-time charge basis. The equipment manu­
facturers typically would not give firm quotes on this type of major 
overhaul and checkup, since they had no idea of what they would 
find before they got into the job. On the basis of past experience with
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factory service, Williams estimated the total out-of-pocket cost for 
this type of work to be $2,000. Benson noted that in normal circum­
stances this cost, being fairly classified as “maintenance,” would be 
tax deductible, but in view of Jaguar’s existing tax loss carryforward, 
the realization of any tax saving on this expense would at best occur 
at such an uncertain point in the future that Benson decided to ignore 
it.
Benson thought it would be wise to make some independent checks 
on the reasonableness of Williams’ estimate, so he first telephoned the 
service department at the Los Angeles showroom of the Faber Ma­
chine Tool Company, who had supplied Jaguar with a large portion 
of their ferrous casting equipment. As Williams had stated, the Faber 
people were extremely unwilling to make any kind of estimate. When 
Benson pressed them, however, they agreed that a range of $1,000 to 
$2,000 was probably quite realistic for their equipment, which num­
bered well over half of the total amount of equipment. On this basis 
Benson concluded that Williams ’estimate was reasonable. Benson’s 
second check was with James Hunt, since Hunt had surveyed Jaguar’s 
equipment and was an expert in the field, and, in addition, had an 
obvious interest in the accuracy of the analysis. Hunt also agreed 
with Williams’ estimate, but added that he thought that up to $10,000 
worth of new equipment would be required to round out Jaguar’s 
capabilities and to keep them up-to-date technologically. Williams 
said that he would defer to Hunt’s opinion, as the expert, and he told 
Benson that this suggestion looked like Hunt’s first contribution to 
the nonferrous operation.
On investment, therefore, Benson decided to work with the assump­
tion of $2,000 cost to bring the existing equipment back into pro­
duction, plus an additional investment of $10,000 in new equipment.
2. Production costs for ferrous castings. Production costs included 
both direct costs (materials and labor) and indirect costs (factory 
overhead). Benson reviewed the company’s job cost records on direct 
costs (Jaguar in effect operated as a job shop of a highly specialized 
kind) and found a fairly wide divergence on individual jobs between 
the proportions of material and labor costs. However, from year to 
year there seemed to be a determinable pattern to the cost of labor 
(about 100 per cent of materials through 1963, and about 125 per 
cent of materials in 1964 and 1965). When Benson inquired about 
the change in the ratio between 1963 and 1964, he was told that it
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was the combined effect of (1) the fact that material usage efficiencies 
were improved with the new equipment installed toward the end of 
the 1963 fiscal year, (2) the fact that production volume tended to 
decrease faster than the direct labor payroll, because of a disinclina­
tion to lay off skilled workers for fluctuations that could be temporary, 
and (3) the fact that wage increases had been granted during the 
1963 calendar year as the result of a new three-year union contract. 
Thus, material usage efficiency increased at about the same time that 
labor efficiency per dollar of cost decreased.
Checking further, Benson compared some price-estimate work­
sheets with their respective job cost sheets. As he suspected, there 
were instances of wide variances between the two. He found, how­
ever, that it was rare for actual direct cost (materials and labor) to 
exceed the quoted price based on the cost estimate. Benson noticed 
that quoted prices were arrived at by first making estimates of ma­
terials and labor costs, and then adding an allowance for factory over­
head, general overhead and profit. This allowance varied from as low 
as 20 per cent in the case of simple jobs or items where a certain price 
had become “standard” to well over 100 per cent in the case of com­
plicated items or pilot runs which were produced on a low volume 
basis.
As Benson saw it, it would be most difficult to predict the direct 
manufacturing costs (materials and labor) of ferrous metals casting, 
and doing so would not serve any purpose, since these costs were 
always recovered in the price of the items cast. However, the existing 
labor force could handle a 20 per cent increase in volume with no in­
crease in total labor cost. In other words, in addition to the labor 
saving on the first $80,000 of increased sales,2 the relevant production 
costs for this portion of the analysis were those items which were 
not specifically covered in the prices charged, but which were never­
theless directly attributable to the ferrous casting operation. With 
this distinction in mind, Benson then considered each of the accounts 
in Factory and General Overhead (Exhibits 2 and 3) to determine 
whether they would vary as a result of the return to ferrous casting.
When he looked at the first factory overhead item, “foremen’s 
salaries,” Benson realized that this criterion could lead to some faulty 
reasoning if it were not applied with care. Williams had told Benson
2 Based on an annual volume of approximately $400,000; i.e., 20% of 
$400,000 =  $80,000.
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that in most respects the Jaguar Plant was working well under full 
capacity; that is, activity could be increased without any additional 
cost. This was true of factory supervision, for example. Jaguar had 
two foremen neither of whom Williams wanted to release unless he 
was convinced that he would never need them again. Both foremen 
had been with the company almost since its inception and were in­
timately familiar with its operations and also with the requirements 
of some of Jaguar’s main customers. Both foremen readily admitted 
that they could substantially expand the scope of their supervision 
without working overtime. Thus, at first sight it seemed that the extra 
or incremental cost of supervision of the ferrous castings section would 
be nil. But this conclusion was based on the assumption that there 
was some other activity; i.e., nonferrous metals casting, that would 
continue to exist and absorb this cost. This assumption, while good 
for the short and medium term, would not necessarily hold for­
ever. For example, if the nonferrous section absorbed this and other 
costs necessary for the existence of the business, and then showed 
a loss, the amount of the loss could conceivably negate the value of 
any gain contributed by the ferrous section. Or, if nonferrous volume 
showed a consistent decline over a period of years while ferrous vol­
ume increased steadily, there would come a time when it would be a 
matter of opinion as to which section was the “main” business of the 
company bearing all the costs necessary for its existence (“basic sup­
port costs”) and which section was “secondary,” bearing only its own 
directly attributable costs. Any reallocation of the basic support costs 
from one section to the other would obviously have a marked effect 
on their apparent profitability. Benson realized that this problem 
could be “solved” by not allocating basic support costs to either 
section, treating them as a pool to be covered by the contributions of 
both sections. The danger of this approach, he felt, was that it could 
lead to problems if the combined contributions from the two sections 
did not cover the pool of support costs. In any event, Benson decided 
that for the time being it was clear that nonferrous casting was and 
would remain the company’s primary activity, and that it could fairly 
bear all the basic support costs.
Benson’s conclusions on each item of Factory Overhead are listed 
below:
Foremens Salaries: No addition for volume increase of at least
50 per cent (confirmed by Williams and 
foremen).
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Technical Salaries:
Insurance:
Factory Supplies 
and Tools:
Utilities:
Depreciation:
Building Maintenance 
and Expense:
Finishing Expenses:
Total, Factory Over­
head:
No increase—technical advice to be sup­
plied by Hunt; salary reflected in officers’ 
salaries below.
The only insurance item to increase would 
be insurance on inventory, which could be 
expected to increase by $500. All other 
types of insurance not affected.
Varies almost directly with activity; esti­
mated at 4 per cent of sales.
Includes heat and light, which would in­
crease slightly, and gas, which would vary 
directly with activity. Estimated at $1,000 
and 2½ per cent of sales, respectively.
No increase for existing facilities or equip­
ment, since full writeoff was being taken 
while idle. New investment of $10,000 
would be depreciated at 20 per cent on de­
clining balance ($2,000 for 1966 fiscal 
year; full depreciation for the year would 
be taken since the installation would be 
close to the beginning of the fiscal year). 
No change expected.
Varies from part to part, depending on cus­
tomers’  specifications. Estimate: 1 per cent 
of sales.
$3,500 +  7½ per cent of sales.
Benton’s conclusions on each item of General and Administrative 
Expense follow:
Officer's Salary: Hunt would receive a salary of $10,000.
Benton saw no purpose in allocating this 
to technical, sales and administrative costs, 
so he included it all under this heading.
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Office Salaries:
Sales Salaries and 
Commissions:
Group Insurance:
Telephone:
Interest:
Payroll Taxes:
Auto Expense:
Building Maintenance 
and Expense:
Legal and Audit Fees: 
Depreciation:
Travel and Entertain­
ment:
Office Expense:
No change.
No change. Hunt would handle all the 
sales work on ferrous metals castings as 
part of his job.
Increase approximately $1,000 to cover 
Hunt and 3 per cent of sales in excess of the 
first additional $80,000. ( On any new pro­
duction, employees would be added once 
the existing slack in the factory is taken 
up.)
Increase approximately 20 per cent or $900.
Approximately 1 per cent of sales. (Six 
per cent interest times assumed two-month 
terms to customers; interest paid to bank 
discounting receivables as sales booked. 
No reduction in other interest items until 
cash throw off, if any, from expanded op­
erations permits reduction of debt.)
Increase $250 to cover Hunt and 2 per cent 
of sales in excess of the first additional 
$80,000. (Actual cost based on payroll 
expense, 6 per cent on assumed 30 per cent 
of sales. Unless payroll is substantially 
different from 30 per cent of sales this esti­
mate will be sufficiently accurate.)
Increase approximately 25 per cent or 
$3,500.
No change expected.
No change.
Hunt to be given an allowance of $500. 
No change.
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Advertising:
Taxes— General:
Miscellaneous:
Total, General and 
Administrative 
Expense:
No change. (Additional advertising was 
not considered an effective way for Jaguar 
to sell ferrous metals casting.)
Increase of $250 in miscellaneous tax and 
license fees.
No change.
$16,400 plus 1 per cent of sales under $80,­
000 and 6 per cent of sales over $80,000.
Pulling together all the figures, Benson constructed the following 
table for the calculation of “production costs for ferrous castings,” or,
more exactly, “costs directly associated with expansion into ferrous
casting”:
Basic First $80,000 Additional
Increase Sales Sales
Materials *
*
Labor None
Factory Overhead $3,500 7½% 7½%
General and Admin.
Expense 16,400 1 6%
$19,900 8½% increase in ex­
penses less labor 
costs
13½%
*Cost normally incurred and recovered through the selling price. Absence 
of normal labor cost for first $80,000 of sales means a saving on this item.
3. Sales forecasts. Benson felt that this was the most crucial area 
in the analysis, and one in which it was most difficult to arrive at any­
thing conclusive. He therefore asked Williams and Hunt each to make 
an independent estimate, at three levels—most likely, conservative 
and optimistic. He asked Williams to build up his estimate from 
specific estimates for major customers who were likely to give Jaguar 
the work, based on his feel for the market and his experience with 
these customers during the 1963/1964 ferrous castings debacle. Some 
customers had vowed at that time never to send any further ferrous
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work to Jaguar, and Benson felt that this attitude would present a 
sufficiently major selling problem so as to warrant explicit recognition. 
Benson also suggested that the estimates be made on a quarterly basis. 
He stressed the importance of estimating what the men thought could 
be done, not what should be done. The forecasts which were made 
turned out to be as follows:
JAGUAR CASTINGS, INC. 
Forecast of Ferrous Castings Sales
For the Fiscal Year Ended April 30, 1966
1st
Quarter
2nd
Quarter
3rd
Quarter
4th
  Quarter Total
Williams
Most Likely 3,000 15,000 37,500 80,000 135,500
Conservative 2,000 5,000 12,500 25,000 44,500
Optimistic
Hunt
4,000 20,000 50,000 125,000 199,000
Most Likely 2,500 7,500 25,000 75,000 110,000
Conservative 1,000 3,000 10,000 25,000 39,000
Optimistic 3,500 10,000 30,000 100,000 143,500
Benson discussed the premises behind each man’s forecast. After 
some discussion, the three men agreed to the final forecast as set 
forth below:
JAGUAR CASTINGS, INC.
Forecast of Ferrous Castings Sales
For the Fiscal Year Ended April 30, 1966
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Total
Most Likely 2,500 10,000 30,000 75,000 117,500
Conservative 1,500 3,000 10,000 25,000 39,500
Optimistic 4,000 15,000 40,000 100,000 159,000
4. Working capital requirements. Benson knew that Jaguar had an 
arrangement with its bank to factor its accounts receivable, with no 
service charge and 6 per cent interest on debit balances. This arrange­
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ment in effect gave Jaguar a line of credit up to the amount of its 
receivables, at 6 per cent interest. Benson felt that this arrangement 
was very flexible, and so reasonable in cost that it would make sense 
for Jaguar to finance its ferrous casting receivables through this 
source, to the extent needed.
Thus the only financing that had to be provided out of Jaguar’s 
own resources was raw material and work-in-process inventory, which 
averaged less than 10% of sales, and against which payables could 
be built up to at least 75%, thus requiring an investment from in­
ternal sources equal to 2½% of sales (25% of the 10% inventory). On 
the basis of the optimistic sales estimate in the final forecast, sales 
could be running at an annual rate of $400,000 by the end of the 
1965 fiscal year. This would require an additional investment of 
$10,000 ( 2½%) for inventory from Jaguar’s resources. Since Mr. 
Hunt was proposing to invest $25,000 in the company, of which 
$12,000 would be required to finance the overhaul of the existing 
equipment and the purchase of new equipment. Financing the in­
ventory estimate would be no problem. On the basis of the most 
likely sales estimate, total inventory of $30,000 would be required by 
year end (10%); the remainder of Hunt’s investment would supply 
$13,000 of this or 43%, so that there was ample leeway in the event 
that payables could not be increased by as much as 75% of the increase 
in inventory. Benson therefore concluded that financing would not 
be a problem in the expansion program.
Benson’s Profit Calculations
All that now remained to be done was for Benson to calculate the 
projected profit at the forecast sales levels. He decided to base his 
calculations on the total projected sales volume for the 1966 fiscal 
year, and also to make calculations based on the annual rate achieved 
during the 4th quarter, on the assumption that this volume would be 
sustained after the end of the 1966 fiscal year.
In making his profit calculations Benson of course needed an as­
sumption about the percentages of materials and direct labor to sales 
of ferrous castings. In practice this would depend on what competi­
tive and business conditions were like when the bids were made. On 
the basis of past experience, however, Williams suggested 30 per cent
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for materials and 35 per cent for direct labor, which Hunt agreed 
seemed reasonable. Benson therefore proceeded with his calculation 
as follows:
Sales price 100%
Less: materials 30%
direct labor 35%
Gross margin 35%
Basic cost increase $19,900
Margin on first $80,000 of sales 35%
Plus labor savings W o
Minus additional expenses 35%
Total 61½%
Margin on additional sales 35%
Less additional expenses 13½%
Total 21½%
JAGUAR CASTINGS, INC.
Pro Forma Statement of Income 
(Under the Assumption of Most Likely Sales)
For the Fiscal 
Year Ended April 
30, 1966
Annual
Rate
Thereafter
Sales Profit Sales Profit
Most Likely
Sales up to $20,000 per quarter 
at a margin of 61½ % $ 52,500 $32,300 $ 80,000 $49,200
Additional sales at 21½ % margin 65,000 14,000 220,000 47,300
Totals $117,500 $46,300 $300,000 $96,500
Less: Increase in fixed costs
Increase in profits before tax
19,900
$26,400
19,900
$76,600
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Pro Forma Statement of Income 
(Under the Assumption of Conservative Sales)
For the Fiscal Annual
Year Ended April Rate
30, 1966 Thereafter
Sales Profit Sales Profit
II. Conservative
Sales up to $20,000 per quarter
@61½ % $34,500 $21,200 $ 80,000 $49,200
Additional sales @21½ % 5,000 1,100 20,000 4,300
Totals $39,500 $22,300 $100,000 $53,500
Less: Increase in fixed costs 19,900 19,900
Increase in profits before tax $ 2,400 $33,600
JAGUAR CASTINGS, INC.
Pro Forma Statement of Income 
(Under the Assumption of Most Optimistic Sales)
For the Fiscal 
Year Ended April 
3 0 , 1966
Annual
Rate
Thereafter
Sales Profit Sales Profit
III. Optimistic
Sales up to $20,000 per quarter 
@61 ½ %
Additional sales @21½ %
Totals
Less: Increase in fixed costs 
Increase in profits before tax
$ 59,000
100,000
$159,000
$36,300
21,500
$57,800
19,900
$37,900
$ 80,000
320,000
$400,000
$ 49,200 
68,800
$118,000
19,900
$ 98,100
Benson noted that in no instance did any of the projections show 
a loss; even the conservative projection showed a small profit for the 
fiscal year ended 1966, as sales built up slowly. Benson thought there
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might be a slight upward bias in the numbers he had calculated, since 
he had assumed that the first $20,000 of sales in each quarter would 
take up the existing slack labor capacity and thus produce a higher 
margin (61½ per cent); however, if sales were building up over time, 
a quarter in which, for example, exactly $20,000 sales were recorded 
would have had unused slack capacity at the beginning, and would 
only have been earning the more normal 21½ per cent margin on part 
of the volume by the end of the quarter, since by that time the sales 
rate would be exceeding $20,000 per quarter. Benson decided not to 
attempt to correct this on the basis that it would give the appearance 
of spurious accuracy in what was after all only a calculation of esti­
mates.
Benson’s Report
Benson’s report is not reproduced here since it mainly contained the 
material already described above. Essentially it presented the set of 
three profit estimates for 1966 and succeeding fiscal years, and a lis t 
and discussion of the assumptions used. It was stressed that the most 
critical assumptions on which the projections were based were: (1) 
that the direct costs for labor and materials on ferrous castings would 
parallel Jaguar’s nonferrous experience with the result that the average 
gross margin would be 35 per cent on ferrous castings; (2) that the 
technical problems that had occurred in 1963 and 1964 would not 
recur; (3) that nonferrous casting operations would continue at the 
current level (i.e., no worse than break even). Given these major 
and other detailed assumptions, and a series of sales forecasts on 
which the CPA firm could obviously not render an opinion, Gardner, 
Stephenson, White and Co. stated as their conclusion that the com­
pany’s expansion program appeared likely to return the company to 
satisfactorily profitable operations. It was stressed, however, that this 
state would have to be continued for some time, and the cash throw- 
off wisely used (i.e., debt repayment rather than additional expansion) 
before Jaguar Castings, Inc.’s financial situation would no longer give 
cause for concern.
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Peoria Quarries, Inc.
The CPA firm of Le Baron, Moseley & Co. had been auditing the 
annual financial statements of Peoria Quarries, Inc., for many years, 
when in the fall of 1961 Mr. Gerald F. Lahey, president of the com­
pany, contacted Mr. John T. McHugh, partner in charge of the Peoria, 
Illinois office and requested an appointment to discuss what he 
described as “that major problem we’ve talked about so many times.” 
It was arranged that he would come in to see Mr. McHugh the follow­
ing day.
Data on Peoria Quarries, Inc.
In preparation for Mr. Lahey’s visit, Mr. McHugh briefly reviewed 
the past few years’ financial statements for Peoria Quarries, Inc., 
Balance sheets as of August 31, 1959, 1960 and 1961 are shown in 
Exhibit 1, page 98. The corporation’s income statements for its 1960 
and 1961 financial years are shown in Exhibit 2, page 99.
Peoria Quarries, Inc., had been founded in 1910 by Mr. Arthur J. 
Lahey, father of the present president. Initially the company had run 
a pure quarrying operation, blasting stone from location, trucking it 
to crushers, and then grinding and screening the crushed stone to 
produce various standard sizes. The stone was sold mostly to con­
tractors for use in road building. In the mid-1930’s, facilities had been 
added for the production of bituminous concrete, produced by care­
fully mixing crushed stone, sand and petroleum asphalt.
After steady sales growth through 1930, profits showed a severe 
drop during the early depression years but regained their previous 
vigor in 1934 and remained generally good thereafter. After World 
War II, Peoria Quarries, Inc., more than quadrupled its sales as the
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Peoria area experienced accelerated rates of road building and general 
construction. The company became the regular suppliers of aggregates 
and other materials to several builders, and also became a large 
supplier of materials for new major highways. Peaks in new highway 
construction caused some fluctuations in sales in the latter part of the 
1950’s. Over the years, a larger and larger proportion of the com­
pany’s sales had been derived from bituminous concrete for road con­
struction. An aggrameter plant for mixing construction concrete had 
also been built in 1957. A breakdown of 1960 dollar sales showed the 
following:
Stone and Dust 22%
Bituminous Concrete 75%
Concrete 3%
Total 100%
The firm’s total personnel usually numbered between 50 and 60, 
nearly all of whom were hourly paid employees. The two operating 
executives, Gerald Lahey (president) and Dominic Valenti (sales 
manager) were sons of the original owners of the business. Both had 
spent a considerable amount of time working in and around the quarry 
as high school students, and both had gone to work in the quarry, under 
their fathers, when they finished school. Mr. Lahey had always con­
centrated on the production aspect of the business. He was very 
familiar with all the technical problems of quarrying, and had himself 
developed a number of improvements to quarrying equipment. Mr. 
Valenti was, like his father, very familiar with the local market for 
quarry products, and also had numerous local contacts. Mr. Valenti, 
who was a jovial and likeable man, had often been drawn into the 
business discussions periodically held by Mr. McHugh and Mr. Lahey. 
However, Mr. McHugh had found that it was a little difficult to 
communicate with him because, despite his unequalled sales ability, 
he had very little interest in figures, and readily admitted so.
After he had reviewed the background of Peoria Quarries, Inc., 
and had taken another look at the corporation’s recent financial state­
ments, as presented in Exhibits 1 and 2, Mr. McHugh sent the files to 
George Ward, a member of the Peoria office’s management services 
staff with a note asking him to study them and to be at his office at 
2 p.m. the following day when Mr. Lahey was due to see him.
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Le Baron, Moseley & Company
Le Baron, Moseley & Company was a national CPA firm with head­
quarters in Chicago, Illinois. It had 12 offices across the country, 
mostly in the Middle West but including New York City and Los 
Angeles. In total it employed over 300 professional personnel and 
had 35 partners.
Le Baron, Moseley & Company was heavily engaged in management 
services (MS) activities. The larger offices, including the Peoria
Exhibit 1
PEORIA QUARRIES, INC.
Balance Sheet
August 31, 1959, 1960 and 1961 
(In  Thousands)
August 31,
1961 1960 1959
Current assets
Cash .......................................................... ... $ 70 $ 92 $ 81
Investment in marketable securities .... 145 140 132
Accounts receivable (net) ..................... 466 302 422
Stone inventories ..................................... 12 13 6
Supplies and sundries ............................. 7 2 2
Total current assets ........................... .. $ 700 $ 549 $ 643
Fixed assets
Land .......................................................... ... $ 75 $ 75 $ 75
Plant and equipment
At cost .................................................. 1,533 1,408 1,240
Depreciation ........................................ (919) (746) (566)
Net plant and equipment ............. . $ 614 $ 662 $ 674
Total fixed assets (net) ........................ $ 689 $ 737 $ 749
$1,389 $1,286 $1,392
Current liabilities
Bank loan .................................................... $ 75 $ 75 $ 75
Accounts payable ................................... 234 104 126
Accruals (including taxes) ................... 97 72 144
Total current liabilities ...................... $ 406 $ 251 $ 345
Stockholders’ equity
Common stock ......................................... $ 450 $ 450 $ 450
Surplus ....................................................... 533 585 597
Total stockholders’ equity ................ ... $ 983 $1,035 $1,047
$1,389 $1,286 $1,392
98
PEORIA QUARRIES, INC.
Exhibit 2
PEORIA QUARRIES, INC.
Statement of Income
For the Years Ended August 31, 1960 and 1961 
(In  Thousands)
Year Ended 
August 31
1961 1960
Stone and d u st.....................................................................  $ 398 $ 466
Bituminous concrete ..........................................................  1,650 1,599
Concrete................................................................................ 136 71
Sales discounts ...................................................................  — (17)
Net sa le s................................................................................ $2,184 $2,119
Cost of sales
Asphalt .................................................................................. $ 396 $ 422
Fuel oil ................................................................................ 81 74
Drilling..................................................................................  79 87
Explosives ...........................................................................  27 25
Sand ......................................................................................  151 141
Laying & spreading bituminous mat’ls...........................  28 33
Liquifier ................................................................................ 3 5
Oil for stone treatment ......................................................  1 1
Freight i n .............................................................................  7 5
Payroll .................................................................................. 419 407
Power ....................................................................................  60 75
Repairs .................................................................................. 303 358
Depreciation .......................................................................  188 189
Taxes (other than federal income tax) ..........................  32 31
Insurance .............................................................................  12 13
Supplies ................................................................................ 77 72
Gasoline ................................................................................ 14 10
Diesel oil .............................................................................  8 6
Lube oil ................................................................................ 7 9
Equipment rental ............................................................... 1 18
Heating o i l ...........................................................................  8 3
Salaries .................................................................................. 58 58
Legal and accounting ........................................................  4 8
Telephone ...........................................................................  5 5
Bad debts ...........................................................................  17 17
Advertising...........................................................................  9 8
Employee welfare ............................................................... 10 11
Sundries ................................................................................ 20 20
Discounts received ............................................................. (10) (11)
Scrap sales .........................................................................  — ___ (2)
Cost of sales .....................................................................  $2,015 $2,098
Operating profit .......................................................................  $ 169 $ 21
Other income ...........................................................................  14 19
Other expense .........................................................................  ( 3 ) $ ( 3 )
Profit before taxes ...................................................................  $ 180 $ 37
Federal income taxes* ..........................................................  77 18
Net income .............................................................................. $ 103 $ 19
* Computed after deducting depletion allowance.
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office, had professional personnel working exclusively on MS engage­
ments. The typical arrangement within the firm was for the partner 
assigned to each client to handle all the firm’s work for the client, in­
cluding audit, tax and MS. The account partners drew on specialist 
personnel as necessary for the performance of the engagements under 
their supervision. The firm’s MS work was concentrated in the areas 
of systems, investment analysis and general organization studies.
Le Baron, Moseley & Company was frequently asked to help on 
MS work as a result of the account partner’s identifying client problems 
where some outside assistance could be valuable. A small portion of 
the firm’s MS engagements came by referral from smaller CPA firms, 
but no attempt had been made to develop this source of business.
Since the typical MS engagement for Le Baron, Moseley & Company 
was with an audit client, it was not the firm’s usual procedure to make 
a formal proposal concerning the work to be undertaken (although 
a proposal would be prepared when requested by the client). Before 
an engagement was started, however, the account partner would dis­
cuss the terms of the engagement with the client, covering such items 
as which personnel would be assigned to the project, per diem rates, 
and an estimate of the total cost of the project.
Le Baron, Moseley & Company’s Relationship
With Peoria Quarries, Inc.
Peoria Quarries, Inc., had been an audit client of Le Baron, Moseley 
& Company since the late 1920’s, when the elder Messrs. Lahey and 
Valenti had decided to incorporate their partnership. Over the years 
both Lahey Senior and Junior had been in the habit of consulting their 
CPAs on business problems that were beyond their ability to appraise 
or where an outsider’s unbiased judgment was felt necessary. In 
addition Le Baron, Moseley & Company had been doing tax work for 
the corporation for a number of years. Mr. John McHugh had been 
the partner on the Peoria Quarries account since 1955. He had per­
formed one MS engagement for Peoria Quarries in that time, in 
addition to the regular annual audit and tax work. His relationship 
with Messrs. Haley and Valenti was cordial but not close.
Mr. Lahey's Problem
When Mr. Lahey came in to see Mr. McHugh, he said that he 
finally had a possible solution to the company’s major problem—the
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approaching exhaustion of its quarry, and wanted Mr. McHugh’s help 
in exploring what should be done. As he said, “You’ve been after me 
for so long to solve this that I’m sure you’ll be relieved to see me 
making progress even if it presents a difficult problem, and I do want 
you to become involved in it.”
Mr. Lahey had a civil engineer make a survey of the quarry in 
1959 and had been advised that the stone supply remaining in the 
quarry was sufficient to last for about six years at “anticipated with­
drawal rates.” For the past two years, Mr. Lahey had been on a 
constant lookout for suitable new quarry sites to which to transfer 
operations when the existing quarry was exhausted, but until very 
recently he had not been able to find a suitable site that was available 
for purchase. The problem was whether he should buy it or not, es­
pecially since he was now very close to being out of rock. He said 
that in actual fact it now seemed as though the quarry would come 
to the end of its useful life by the end of the 1964 operating year.
Mr. Lahey said that the rapidly approaching exhaustion date for 
his quarry had caused him an increasing amount of concern in recent 
months, because he knew it would take between one and two years 
to prepare a new site for operations after it had been acquired. This 
meant that if he did not locate a suitable new site soon, and begin 
preparing it, there would possibly be a substantial lag between the 
exhaustion of the existing quarry and the date of readiness of the 
new quarry (if any could be found). Mr. Lahey said that his ex­
tensive search for a new quarry site had eventually convinced him 
that all of the situable sites in the greater Peoria area were either in 
use or were owned by quarry operators who had purchased them some 
time back with a view to putting them into operation when their 
existing quarries were exhausted. He had therefore been brought to 
the conclusion that there were only two alternatives open to him: 
Either he could liquidate his company when the existing quarry was 
eventually exhausted, or he could acquire a new quarry site well 
outside Peoria and commence operations in a new area. Since he 
had spent all of his working life  in the company’s quarry, and since 
the business had been owned and operated by members of the Lahey 
and Valenti families for almost 50 years, he was very reluctant to 
choose the liquidation alternative. Furthermore, because the fortunes 
of the two families were dependent on the continued profitable ex­
istence of the company, and since he did not feel, at his age, like 
either retiring or going out and looking for employment in some other 
company, he felt that he would of necessity choose the second alterna-
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tive; namely, acquiring a new quarry outside Peoria, if that was at all 
possible. Having made this decision, in recent months he had travelled 
extensively in the surrounding countryside and had been pleased to 
find that several suitable sites were available. After thorough con­
sideration of the technical aspects, he and his sales manager, Mr. 
Dominic Valenti, had concluded that a site in Carlock, Illinois, some 
30 miles to the southeast of Peoria, was the most suitable. He and 
Mr. Valenti had tentatively agreed that they would try to work out 
some way of eventually transferring the company’s operations to the 
Carlock site, and had begun contacting the owners of the land in 
question, and the officials of the town of Carlock, in order to initiate 
the negotiations that would be necessary for the acquisition of the land 
and for the approval by the town of quarrying operations on the site.
Mr. Lahey said that the new site’s distant location from Peoria 
obviously was a disadvantage. In his experience, it was not possible 
for his company to compete beyond a 16-mile radius of its quarry site, 
because the higher transportation costs could not be passed on to the 
customer. In the ordinary course of events, therefore, he expected 
that a quarry established at the Carlock site could economically serve 
only very few of the market areas currently being served by the Peoria 
quarry site. However, Mr. Lahey said that there was some possibility 
of shipping quarried and prepared rock from the Carlock site by rail 
to the company’s facilities in Peoria. The Topeka, Peoria & Western 
Railway line ran approximately half a mile from the Carlock site, and 
right alongside the Peoria site. It therefore seemed that it would be 
physically possible for arrangements to be made to have rock and 
other materials shipped from Carlock if this were found to be eco­
nomically sound.
The biggest advantage of the Carlock site would be that it lay less 
than a mile from the planned location of Interstate Route 55, a new 
highway planned to link Chicago and St. Louis. It was known that 
land had been acquired close to the borders of Carlock for portions 
of the new  highway. W ork was proceeding on it in 1961, b u t the most 
effort had been concentrated on the portions close to the two main 
cities that the road would connect. According to Mr. Lahey, a new 
quarry on the site in Carlock which he had in mind would be the 
nearest quarry to Route 55 when the Carlock section was being built. 
Based on the simple economics of transportation costs, Mr. Lahey 
said that he was confident the Carlock site would be able to secure 
contracts for providing a good part of the materials needed for the 
Carlock section of the highway. Mr. Lahey said that he had no idea
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at the present as to the profitability of operations at Carlock, but his 
years of experience had taught him the value of having an “assured” 
market near the quarry site.
Mr. Lahey stated that he had tentatively ( and hopefully) made up 
his mind that this was a sound solution to the problem. However, be­
fore finally committing himself to this new course of action, he had 
come to Mr. McHugh because he wanted him to review the situation 
and give him his opinion as to the desirability of the proposed action. 
In particular, Mr. Lahey Wanted some figures on the economics of 
acquiring the Carlock site. As he pointed out, the money that the 
stockholders had in the company could easily be withdrawn and in­
vested in income-producing securities if the company were liquidated. 
Therefore, what he wanted to do was to be reasonably sure that the 
move to Carlock would produce a return sufficiently high enough to 
justify making the investment. He stressed that he was “first and last 
a quarry man,” while he knew that Mr. McHugh had had a variety 
of business experience. Mr. Lahey said that while he doubted that 
there was anybody in the area who knew more about quarry operations 
than he himself did, he would be the first to admit that he was not 
at all adept at analyzing business problems in a proper fashion. This 
was why he had come to Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh said he would be glad to help Mr. Lahey. He and 
Mr. Ward outlined the approach they would take to the problem, 
indicated the kinds of information they would need, the analyses they 
would make and the results which they hoped to achieve. Mr. McHugh 
said that a considerable amount of analytical work would be required 
in order for him to be able to tell Mr. Lahey whether or not the 
proposed investment was economically justifiable, and that since much 
of it was future oriented there would, of course, be a fair number of 
“ifs, ands, and buts” attached to the conclusions that could be drawn. 
He said he was delighted to hear Mr. Lahey was making progress and 
hoped the analysis would show that the solution was at hand.
Questions
1. Prepare a “work program” listing in detail the kinds of data 
that would be needed in order to analyze Peoria’s problem. What 
information would need to be obtained from sources outside the com­
pany? How would you get these data?
2. Based on the information available in the case, what do you 
think will be the crucial factors influencing the profitability of a new
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quarry for Carlock? In estimating future profitability, how would you 
deal with the uncertainty surrounding estimates of these key variables?
3. How many man-days do you think would be required to ac­
complish the task that Mr. Lahey has outlined?
Commentary on Peoria Quarries, Inc.
Mr. McHugh’s Proposal
Several days after Mr. Lahey’s visit to him, Mr. McHugh drove out 
to the quarry and told Mr. Lahey that they were ready to start the 
project that Mr. Lahey had asked him to look into. Mr. McHugh told 
Mr. Lahey that a considerable amount of work would be required in 
order for him to be able to answer the question, “Would a move of the 
company’s operations to Carlock be a sound investment of the com­
pany’s funds?” He pointed out, however, that the decision to move 
to Carlock was indeed a very major decision, and was one which 
could have a vital effect on the fortunes of the company. He there­
fore did not consider it inappropriate for a major study to be made 
on a question of this importance. Mr. Lahey replied that Mr. McHugh 
had correctly stated the question that was concerning him, and that 
he was fully prepared to have Mr. McHugh carry out as full and 
complete a study as was necessary for a satisfactory answer to be 
obtained.
“I’ve talked this over with George Ward,” Mr. McHugh said. “As 
I think I have told you, he’s a member of our management services 
staff and works full time on projects like this. George has worked on 
a large number of investment analysis projects that we have been 
called in to study, and he has developed an approach which gets the 
job done as efficiently as possible. He looked over all the financial 
statements and working papers that we have in your file back in the 
office. Together, we came to the conclusion that George would need 
to work on this project for about four weeks in order to answer your 
question properly. Obviously, depending on how well his work 
progresses, the job could take either less or more than four weeks. 
If, after the preliminary stages, it looks as though much more than 
four weeks is going to be required, we will naturally advise you of this 
before proceeding any further. On the whole, however, we have found 
that estimates like this turn out pretty well, so there is no need for 
you to worry about the project getting out of hand. What we’ll have 
George do is more or less the following:
1. Define the various factors that will affect the results of your new 
investment in Carlock.
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2. Gather extensive data on these factors. The process of gathering 
the data will consist largely of George spending a fair amount of time 
discussing these factors with you and Dominic, followed by an ex­
tensive analysis of all the detailed financial data you have.
3. Analyze the data collected in terms of the important factors 
previously determined and draw conclusions.
Since we expect to complete the analysis after about one month’s 
work, we will bill you at completion. If it turns out that the work 
has to be carried out over an extended period of time, I’ll propose 
an alternative billing arrangement under which we’ll bill you from 
time to time for work completed. I don’t expect that very much of 
my own time will be required on this job, as George is perfectly 
capable of carrying it out, but I will, of course, supervise his activities, 
and contribute from my extensive knowledge of your company’s past 
and present operations. At the most our bill will include several days 
of my time charged at the same rate as you’ve paid for my time on 
your audits.
Mr. Ward’s Analysis
When Mr. Ward arrived at the quarry site the following day, he 
told Mr. Lahey that the first thing that he wanted to do was to 
observe operations in the quarry and the rock crushing plants, and 
to spend some time in the office looking at the company’s records and 
record-keeping systems. Mr. Lahey gave Mr. Ward a hard hat and 
took him down into the quarry pit. He introduced him to the men 
working there, explained to them what Mr. Ward had come to do, and 
asked them to answer all of his questions. Later that day he also 
introduced Mr. Ward to the other employees working at different 
parts of the site.
After these visits and discussions with Messrs. Lahey, Valenti and 
others, Mr. Ward began to firm up his tentative conclusions as to the 
form that his study would take and the types of information that he 
would need. Remembering that Mr. Lahey had asked whether the 
move to Carlock would be a suitable investment, Mr. Ward reasoned 
that what he ought to do was measure the results of opening the 
Carlock quarry against what would otherwise have happened if the 
Peoria quarry were simply to be operated until exhausted. He decided, 
therefore, to first set out an estimate of exactly what would happen 
if the move were not made. He decided to call this the “Base Case’’ 
and to measure all the other alternatives against the expectations under
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this base. As a result of his discussions with the company executives, 
he thought that the following assumptions described the base case 
accurately:
1. Reserves at Peoria would be adequate through fiscal 1964 
(1,600,000 tons).
2. Operations at the 1961 level would continue until the stone 
reserves had been exhausted, then the plant would be liquidated.
3. Capital expenditures for necessary items of quarrying equipment 
would be $50,000 in 1962 and $75,000 in 1963 and in 1964.
4. Depreciation write-offs would be rescheduled to anticipate the 
1964 close-down.
Having established the characteristics of the base case, Mr. Ward’s 
next step was to draw up pro forma estimates of the cash flow that 
would be realized under that case. The following table summarizes 
the base case cash flows:
Inflow of Cash—Base Case 
(In Thousands)
Fiscal Year Operations Liquidations
$455
$455
1961 $ 77
1962 272
1963 174
1964 134
1965
Total $657
Exhibit 3 (pages 108-109) indicates in detail how the above cash flows 
were arrived at. In  line w ith assumption 2 above, operating results 
for 1962, 1963 and 1964 were estimated at being the same as ex­
perienced in 1961, with two exceptions.
1. Allowance was made for anticipated increases each year for 
payroll, supplies, repairs and miscellaneous expense.
2. Allowance was made for the rescheduling of depreciation (as­
sumption 4 above) as explained more fully in Exhibit 3.
106
PEORIA QUARRIES, INC.
One unusual feature of the base case analysis was the determination 
that a planned liquidation at the end of the 1964 fiscal year would 
result in an additional $77,000 of cash inflow for fiscal year 1961, even 
though the 1961 year was already completed. This would occur 
because, as shown in Exhibit 3, rescheduling the depreciation deduc­
tions would wipe out the 1961 taxable income, thus eliminating the 
$77,000 tax liability for that year.
Mr. Ward discussed his base case estimates with Messrs. Lahey and 
Valenti a number of times because he wanted to be sure that the base 
he used to compare all the possible alternatives was as accurate as 
possible. Most of the discussion that the three men had on this topic 
centered around the problem of estimating the proceeds from liquidat­
ing the company’s operations after the close of the 1964 fiscal year, 
when it was assumed that the quarry would be exhausted. The figures 
shown in the last part of Exhibit 3 for liquidation proceeds were arrived 
at only after considerable discussion. After the three men agreed on 
the most likely liquidation values for each group of assets, Mr. Ward 
computed the net proceeds after applicable capital gains taxes and 
rounded the results to the figures shown in the exhibit.
After satisfying himself that his cash flow estimates for the base case 
were as accurate as it was practical for him to compute, Mr. Ward 
turned his attention to the factors which would influence the financial 
results of operations at Carlock. Again, he first constructed a Carlock 
base case, or a set of basic assumptions relating to Carlock operations. 
These were:
1. Primary circuit built at Carlock during winter 1961-1962
2. Recrushing facilities installed by summer 1962
3. Asphalt plants number 1 and 3 moved to Carlock early in 1963
4. Peoria reserves 1,600,000 tons as of August 1961 (same as as­
sumption 1 in Peoria base case)
5. 100,000 tons shipped annually to Peoria from Carlock by rail 
until Peoria reserves fail. Peoria entirely supplied from Carlock there­
after
6. Prices constant at 1961 level.
The above assumptions recognized the tentative plan to which Mr. 
Lahey had alluded when he had first discussed the problem with Mr.
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Cash Flow—Base Case 
(In Thousands)
I. Operations, 1962-1964
1962 1963 1964
Sales (as 1961) ..................................................... ......  2,185 2,185 2,185
Cost of sales (as 1961) ........................................ ......  (2,015) (2,015) (2,015)
Add back 1961 depreciation .......................... 188 188 188
Deduct scheduled annual depreciation ........ ......  (211) (151) (121)
Payroll, supplies, repairs & miscellaneous
(expected increase over 1961) ................... (29) (58) (87)
Operating profit ..................................................... 118 149 150
Other income (net) ........................................ 11 11 11
Profit before taxes ................................................ 129 160 161
Adjust for recomputed depreciation
(see depreciation schedule below) ............ 13 (18) (33)
Adjusted profit before taxes ............................... 116 178 194
Federal income taxes* .................................... 18** 62 73
Profit after taxes .................................................. 98 116 121
Add back depreciation .................................... 224 133 88
Deduct capital expenditures ........................... ......  (50) (75) (75)
Cash inflow from operations ............................... ......  $ 272 $ 174 $ 134
* Computed after deducting depletion allowance.
** Computed after deducting 1961 adjusted loss carried forward—see de­
preciation schedule below.
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Cash flow—base case 
Depreciation
As scheduled, 8/31/61 (includ­
ing $50 M for $200 M budgeted 
1962-64 capital expenditure*) 
Reallocate total over 1961— 1964
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Total
188 211 151 121 100 80 851**
20% straight line ................ .....  43 43 43 43 172
80% declining balance ..... .....  363 181 90 45 679
Reallocated total .................. .....  406 224 133 88 851
Change in depreciation ........
Reallocated depreciation.....
....  218*** 13 (18) (33) 180
(100) (80) (180)
* Net value of $150 M included in part II, below.
** Total scheduled depreciation .................. 851
Less: 1961 depreciation ..........................  188
Total after 1961 ..................................... 663
Less: Amount for 1962-64
capital expenditures ..............................  50
Net book value of Plant and
Equipment 8/31/61 ............................  613
1961 reallocation would reduce taxable income to nil, and result in a small 
loss carry forward to 1962. The 1961 “loss” would produce a cash saving of 
$77 (M) previously provided for income taxes. (See Exhibit 2.)
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II. Liquidation, 1965
Estimated value of land, net of taxes on appreciation ........................  $150,000
Estimated scrap value of plant and equipment, (1) including unde­
preciated $150 M of $200 M additions in 1962-1964, and (2) $50 
M, net of taxes on book profit, for assets acquired through 1961 
(depreciated to nil value) ....................................................................  $200,000
Estimated reduction of working capital investment (receivables and
inventories, less payables and accruals) ...........................................  $145,000
Estimated allowance for contingencies, liquidation expenses, fencing
site, etc. ....................................................................................................  $(40,000)
Total estimated liquidation proceeds* ...................................................... $455,000
* Excludes: Cash, investments and bank loan, all of which could be liquidated 
at any time, irrespective of closing down business. $455,000 represents net 
proceeds only obtainable when and if business closed down.
McHugh. This was the intention to keep the company’s entire plant 
in operation and to transfer only part of it to the new site in Carlock. 
In addition, subject to the necessary arrangements being made with 
the railroad, it was the intention to ship large quantities of crushed 
stone from Carlock to Peoria each year. The purpose of this would be 
to supply the Peoria operation with the raw materials necessary to 
meet local demand for quarry products. Where necessary, additional 
processing would be carried out with the equipment remaining at 
Peoria. The Carlock quarry would thus not only supply its local 
market ( including Interstate Highway 55) but would also supply raw 
and partly finished materials to the Peoria quarry for sale from that 
point. Although it was admittedly most unusual for a quarrying com­
pany to ship large quantities of crushed rock from one site to another, 
Mr. Lahey and Mr. Valenti insisted that Mr. Ward include this assump­
tion, because they believed that it would be absolutely necessary for 
the shipments to be made and in fact they fully intended to make them 
unless it was proven to them that this action would be unprofitable for 
the company as a whole.
Mr. Ward realized that the degree of financial success of the Carlock 
venture would depend upon a number of additional factors which 
could not be forecast with much certainty. He decided, therefore, to 
make a number of alternative computations utilizing different possible 
values for these additional factors. The factors in question were:
1. Peoria sales potential
2. Yearly capital expenditures
3. Railroad freight rates for the Carlock-Peoria shipments
4. The amount of Route 55 business which Carlock might get.
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The following table sets up eight different combinations of possible 
values of the above four variable factors. The eight combinations 
were those which the three men had decided were a good represen­
tation of the range from optimism (Case X) to almost complete pes­
simism (Case X-7). Mr. Ward decided that if he could express the 
financial outcomes of each of the possible combinations on a sched­
ule such as that shown below, it would be relatively easy for the 
people at Peoria Quarries, Inc., to appreciate the significance and im­
portance of the variability of each of the four critical factors.
Table of Values
_____________________________________ Cases_______________
Variables_____________ X X-1 X-2 X-3 X-4 X-5 X-6 X-7
Peoria sales growth
5% per year *  *  *  *  *  *  *
None *
Yearly capital expenditures
$100,000/year * * * *
$150,000/year
Railroad rate
Sliding scale (1) * * * * * *
50¢/ton flat rate * •
Route #55 business
6 mi. each way *
from Carlock * * * *
Stone only (6 mi.) *
None
(1) 50¢/ton for first 200,000 tons per year; 25¢/ton for additional 
tonnage.
Based on a study of the company’s recent income statements, Mr. 
Ward next prepared an income statement for Case X for the years 
1962 through 1966. (See Exhibit 4, pages 112-114.) Each of the 
expense items was carefully examined by reference to whatever evi­
dence was available to determine the way in which it varied. This 
involved several days of thorough analysis of all the items on the in­
come statement and many hours of discussion with Mr. Lahey and 
with members of his bookkeeping and operating staff.
Having used his income statement estimates (Exhibit 4, Part I) to 
determine the expected cash flow from Case X (Exhibit 4, Part II)
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Mr. Ward then compared Case X with the base case, as shown on the 
table below:
Case X Vs. Base Case 
(In Thousands)
Cash Flows* Differential 18% Discount
Fiscal Yr. X Base X Minus Base Factor*** Value
1961
1962 (1) 149 272
(77) 1.0 (77)
(2) 
1963(1)
(353)
239 174
(476) .92 (438)
(2) (20) 45 .78 35
1964 341 134 207 .66 137
1965 156 455 (299) .57 (170)
1966 174 174 .47 82
1967 163 163 .40 65
1968 167 167 .35 58
1969 175 175 .28 49
1970 175 175 .25 44
1971 183 183 .21 39
1972-81 167/yr. 167/yr. .93 155
(21)
(Note: A trial at 17 per cent produced a total of +21, so actual rate is 
about 17½  per cent.) (1) Operations (2) Capital Investment at Carlock 
* (O ut) flow.
** Tax saving on depreciation rescheduling.
*** Continuous compounding.
The third column above was actually what Mr. Ward felt was most 
important in the comparison, namely the differences in cash flow 
between the base case and Case X. After experimentation with dis­
count tables to reduce the cash flows from 1962 onward to present 
values, Mr. Ward found that the differential column would discount 
to 0 (i.e., discounted inflows =  discounted outflows) at an interest rate 
of approximately 17½  per cent. He thus concluded that if Case X 
were an accurate representation of what actually turned out at Carlock 
a 17½  per cent return after taxes would be obtained as a result of 
setting up operations there.
Mr. Ward then proceeded to make additional calculations to reflect 
the variations from Case X, in Cases X-1 through X-7. In each instance 
what he did was to start with the relevant figures from Case X and
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to adjust them by the appropriate changes called for by variations 
involved in each alternative. For example, Case X-2 was postulated 
to be the same as Case X, with the exception that the railroad rate 
would be a flat 50¢ per ton for all shipments rather than a sliding rate. 
Exhibit 5, page 116, indicates the calculations that Mr. Ward made 
to take this into account. Using the Case X-2 cash flows determined 
in Exhibit 5, Mr. Ward then compared Case X-2 with the base case 
as follows:
Case X-2 Vs. Base Case 
( In Thousands)
Cash Flows* Differential 10% Discounting
Fiscal Yr. X-2 Base X-2 Minus Base Factor*** Value
1961
1962 (1) 149
77**
272
(77) 1.0 (77)
(2) 
1963(1)
(353)
239 174
(476) .95 (450)
(2) (20) 45 .87 39
1964 341 134 207 .79 182
1965 115 455 (340) .72 (245)
1966 116 116 .65 76
1967 101 101 .59 60
1968 101 101 .54 55
1969 102 102 .49 50
1970 98 98 .44 43
1971 101 101 .40 41
1972-81 86/yr. 86/yr. 2.47 213
(13)
(1) Operations.
(2) Capital investment at Carlock.
* (O ut) flow.
** Tax saving on depreciation rescheduling; refer note to Exhibit 3. 
*** Continuous compounding.
Mr. Ward calculated that the differential column above indicated 
a 10 per cent rate of return for Case X-2.
In like fashion, Mr. Ward made the necessary calculations for all 
the cases through Case X-7. The detailed calculations for Case X-1 
and X-3 through X-7 have been omitted here, but the cash flows and 
differentials for all the cases are shown in Exhibit 6, p. 117.
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Case X-2, Cash Flow*
(In  Thousands)
(Case same as X, except rail rate 500/ton for all shipments)
Cash Flow 
Case X
Freight Expense Differential Cash Flow 
Case X-2X-2 X Cash After Tax
1962 (1) 149 25 25 — — 149
(2) (353) (353)
1963 (1) 239 50 50 — — 239
(2) (20) (20)
1964 341 50 50 — — 341
1965 156 269 184 85 41 115
1966 174 328 208 120 58 116
1967 163 344 216 128 62 101
1968 167 360 224 136 66 101
1969 175 392 240 152 73 102
1970 175 408 248 160 77 98
1971 183 424 256 168 81 101
1972-81 167/yr. 424 256 168 81 86/yr.
* (out)flow.
(1) Operations.
(2) Capital Investment at Carlock.
The following is a summary of the results shown in Exhibit 6:
Summary of Rates of Return
Case Rate
X 18%
X-1 12%
X-2 10%
X-3 2%
X-4 15%
X-5 14%
X-6 10%
X-7 ( Negative)
Mr. Ward’s Conclusion
After studying the results of his many calculations, Mr. Ward made 
the following notes and sent them to Mr. McHugh as a draft of a 
comment to go to Mr. Lahey:
Case X represents the most optimistic course of events that could 
be realistically hoped for after the move to Carlock. Conceivably,
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Peoria sales might grow more than 5 per cent per year, or the 
railroad might grant an even more favorable sliding rate on 
Carlock-Peoria hauling, or yearly capital expenditures might be 
kept below $100,000, or Carlock might capture more Route 55 
business. However, the chances of the company getting any of 
these “good breaks” without offsetting setbacks seem remote. 
Under the rather optimistic assumptions of Case X, the invest­
ment in Carlock would return 18 per cent.
Case X-7 makes clear the importance of Peoria sales growth to 
the Carlock proposition. Optimistic assumptions were again made 
of all factors, with the exception that Peoria sales were assumed 
to hold constant at 1961 levels. In this case, no return is realized 
on the Carlock investment, and the company shows operating 
losses after the completion of Route 55. Without added sales 
revenue, profits are made impossible by the haulage charge and 
the added payroll at Carlock. A similar picture would result if 
sales volume increased and prices were to fall.
If sales do grow at the 5 per cent rate, then Case X-1 is possibly 
the most realistic case calculated. The optimistic assumptions of 
Case X are repeated, except that yearly capital expenditures for the 
company are set at $150,000 instead of $100,000. The higher figure 
seems more realistic if sales are going to grow as assumed. In fact, 
the $150,000 may still be too low in light of capital investment 
levels of recent years, which have averaged close to $200,000 per 
year. Case X-1 shows a return of only 12 per cent.
Cases X-2 and X-3 show the importance of securing a fairly 
generous sliding scale rate from the railroad. In Case X-2 the 
optimistic assumptions of Case X were repeated, except that a flat 
rate of 500/ton was assumed for the Carlock-Peoria movement. 
The rate of return drops to 10 per cent, from 18 per cent in Case X.
Case X-3 assumes $150,000 capital outlays each year in addition 
to the 500/ton flat rate. The rate of return falls to 2 per cent.
Cases X-4, X-5 and X-6 explore the effects of failure to get the 
share of Route 55 business which Messrs. Lahey and Valenti would 
expect (6 miles each way from Carlock). Case X-5 shows that 
if no Route 55 sales were made at all, the rate of return on the 
Carlock investment would be 4 per cent lower than under Case X. 
Although these effects are of some weight if taken at face value, 
they are not significant in light of the very small likelihood that 
Peoria Quarries, Inc., would be completely shut out of the job. 
In other words, loss of (say) one half of projected Route 55 sales 
would not have any important effect upon the overall profitability 
of the Carlock proposal.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Of the various cases studied, the most optimistic indicated a 
rate of return of 18 per cent on the Carlock investment. Six of 
the eight combinations showed a return of 10 per cent or more. 
The Carlock proposal should be considered by management and 
stockholders in terms of these estimates and other factors of im­
portance to them. The two key factors which would determine 
the profitability of the company after the move to Carlock would 
be the sales growth at Peoria and the railroad haulage rate which 
would have to be paid. Also significant, but not crucial, would 
be the amount of Route 55 business which Carlock might get. (A 
fair amount is said to be almost certain.) With any sales growth, 
yearly capital expenditures would undoubtedly be at least $150,000.
Mr. McHugh Reviews Mr. Ward’s Analysis With Mr. Lahey
Five weeks to the day after Mr. Lahey had given Mr. McHugh the 
"go-ahead,” Mr. McHugh and Mr. Ward drove out to the quarry again 
to see Mr. Lahey. He took with him a complete series of schedules 
showing Mr. Ward’s calculations for the base case and for Carlock 
alternatives X through X-7. He had also prepared a memorandum 
much along the lines of the draft submitted to him by Mr. Ward (see 
above). Mr. Lahey was very pleased that Mr. McHugh had been 
able to come up with some answers for him, and listened attentively 
as Mr. McHugh explained Mr. Ward’s analysis to him. After Mr. 
McHugh had finished, Mr. Lahey asked a number of questions, and 
then said, "Pardon me if I have missed the point, John, but w ith all 
those numbers you have there, you don’t seem to have come up with 
a rate of return for the Carlock investment at all. All of these rates 
of yours are something that George calculated by comparing various 
Carlock alternatives with something called the "base case.” I’m still 
not sure whether you really have answered my question about how 
profitable operations are going to be at Carlock.”
Mr. McHugh replied as follows, “Jerry, the whole point of this 
analysis is that if you don’t open up at Carlock, you will definitely 
have to shut down here in Peoria at about the end of 1964. From an 
analytical point of view, you definitely have the choice of simply 
running through 1964 and then packing up. Therefore, if you consider 
any alternative courses of action, they have to be considered in relation 
to the improvement in the situation that they bring about, over and 
above that which might otherwise have been expected to take place.
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After all, there is nothing you can do about the base case events if you 
do not make the Carlock investment. However, if you do move into 
Carlock, then there are any number of things that can happen, and one 
of them will be that the base case will fall away. That is why each 
of the Carlock alternatives measures the difference in the situation 
under the specific assumptions used, compared to what would other­
wise have happened had you not gone into Carlock at all. Therefore, 
when we talk about a rate of return for the Carlock alternatives, 
we’re really talking about the rate of return produced by the differen­
tials over and above that base case which would otherwise have 
happened. If you think about it, I’m sure you’ll realize the validity 
of this point.”
“I’m not so sure that I see what you’re driving at, John. However, 
can you give me some specific advice as to whether or not it will be 
a good investment to open up operations at Carlock?”
“Jerry, that’s up to you. You know far more than George or I 
about conditions in the quarry business and are far better able than we 
are to decide which of the Carlock cases in George’s calculations is 
likely to be the closest to reality. One thing I can say, though. It seems 
unlikely that Case X will be realized. That’s unfortunate, because 
Case X has the best rate of return. But if you change only one assump­
tion, the assumption about sales growth, then even Case X turns out 
to be a very poor investment. Going on the assumption that there will 
be sales increases of 5 per cent per year, then your possible rate of 
return seems to be about 10 per cent on the average, plus or minus 
quite a lot. Frankly, I don’t think that a 10 per cent expectation is 
much to shout about in your business. If I were you, I would give very 
serious thought to the possibility of forgetting about the Carlock deal 
altogether.”
“John, I have to disagree with you there. What you said is that the 
best rate of return we can get is 18 per cent, the worst 0 or less, and 
the range of intermediate values around 10 per cent. I agree that that’s 
not too great, but I think we’re going to go into the deal even if it 
does only promise a 10 per cent return, because being in the business 
means something to us. I’m sure that I speak for all of us in the com­
pany, executives and stockholders, when I say that we would like to see 
our company stay in existence. If it means accepting a 10 per cent rate 
of return in order to do that, then I think that we’re just going to 
tighten our belts a little and be very happy with 10 per cent or what­
ever we can get.
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“Thank you very much for your prompt work on the project. I’m 
going to study George’s analysis carefully. I think this way of compar­
ing alternatives does make sense after all. If I get stuck I’ll call you 
or him, if I may. Thanks for coming over.”
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